

MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, A MODEL FOR ROMANIA?

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Abstract

This article should be regarded as work in progress and represents a part of a future PhD thesis. It is structured in three parts. The first will present, in its most important characteristics, Will Kymlicka's vision of *multicultural citizenship*. The second will constitute a compendious summary of the main themes, ideas and concepts from the field of ethnic relations. The third one will realize, with the inherent parsimony of an enterprise of such a limited extent, a description of the statistical facts and (partially) of the traditional cultural environment in which the ethnic communities from Romania co-exist and interact with one another.

Keywords: multiculturalism, citizenship, minorities, ethnic groups, ethnicity.

Multicultural citizenship and multicultural liberalism¹

Will Kymlicka calls into question the neutrality of the modern state from the ethnic and moral perspective – a form of neutrality which is considered by most of the authors as being characteristic for the modern state and especially for the modern representative democracies. The modern state, even in his democratically organized form, is not neutral and/or disinterested in regard with the culture (or cultures) embedded in that society (the term “culture” being used here in the largest and non-restrictive possible sense). In this concern, the Canadian author talks about a “societal culture” which is seen as being mostly centered upon a common language, and implying the existence of a common set of customs, lifestyle, perceptions over the self, which make a certain population recognizable in the social context wherein it exists.

Starting from here, Kymlicka develops the idea that the state, notwithstanding the fact that this is claimed by those which invoke

¹ For this section, the main bibliographical source will consist of Will Kimlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*.

the vision of civic nationalism, cannot remain neutral about in the issue of the social culture/cultures present within its territory. Whether knowingly or not, in the process of its development the state achieves an ethnic or cultural coloring, gathered around the existence of a common official language (several official languages).

This model of growth of the modern state, which invalidates the neutrality claimed by it, is at least in a first phase an organic one. The developing economy, the commodifying of the social relations and the various needs related to that (unifying the territory, instituting a centralized type of authority in place of the feudal organization, building an administration based on detailed and intelligible rules, etc) as well as the growing importance of the education (that too related with the emergence of a new type of economy) represents the beginning phase. Later on, the state which regulates, punishes, educates, administer the justice using the language of *one* community from those existent within its borders will reach the point from which the vision about life of *that* particular community became (or could become) sacred and ritualized. On this line we can talk about the existence of a national anthem, of an official history, an (official) national holyday, as well as an official language utilized in the judicial, administrative and public health systems – all these making the identity elements of one particular culture to become, even indirectly, public, while those of the other cultures continues to remain private.

This will generate not only a reductionist-type approach to a set of complex realities which, in order to be properly and accurately understood, should been placed in a context sensitive to the cultural diversity and to the ways of life and understanding of a specific community within a territory, (Walzer, 1983; Walzer, 1987), but also a situation of structural inequality in regard to the rights of citizenship. This thing could be considered, according to Kimlicka, a failure of the liberal view on citizenship – a view which assumes neutrality from the ethnic perspective. The author mentions and reproduces the parallel, drawn repeatedly by various authors, between the prevention and settlement mechanisms by placing the

ethnic referential at the individual (instead of collective) level and, simultaneously, by claiming the ethnical neutrality of the state, on the one hand, and the effort to put an end to the religious wars from the beginning of the modern era (XVIth-XVIIth centuries) by secularization, the separation between the church and the state and by setting forth the confessional non-affiliation of the state, circumscribing the religion to the private sphere, on the other. However, he says, this parallelism was invalidated by the reality.

For clearing the things up in this matter, Kymlicka make a series of terminological and conceptual clarifications, which are necessary in order to advance his own vision about the multicultural citizenship. Thus, he reiterates the difference between *national minorities* and *ethnic groups*, already present in the literature, and gives it new significations.

The *national minorities* are those communities which live in a specific and traditional way within a larger territory, which became minorities (by being incorporated into a larger state, or by switching the jurisdiction over a territory from a particular state to another) in a voluntary manner or not (example: conquest, transfer of territory, the formation of a new state) and which animated active societies and might have had self-governing experiences in the past (for example the Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia or Serbia, the Croats and Slovenes from the former Yugoslavia, etc).

The *ethnic groups* are represented by the communities formed mainly by immigrants, who chose to leave their homeland and have as a purpose their acceptance and integration in the country of their choice, without becoming disinterested with their own identity (traditions, lifestyle, religion). This latter purpose is yet subordinated to the further - acquiring full rights within the state into which they have immigrated (examples: the Turks from Germany, the Algerians and Moroccans from France and Italy, the Pakistanis from the UK, etc). The states which include several national minorities are, according to Kymlicka, multinational states, and those which reunite many ethnic groups are multiethnic states.

Apart from those two already mentioned types of communities, the cultural and ethnic diversity can be determined by the presence within a given territory of three more categories of population: *the members of a religious sect who immigrated together, the refugees and the colored population* (especially the African-Americans from the US). According to a later article, published in "Altera" magazine no. 10 (1999), the author refines those categories, mentioning the *isolationist religious sects, the metics and the racial castes* (Kymlicka apud Salat, 2001, pp. 98-99).

The members of the *isolationist religious sects* are individuals who willingly immigrated or took refuge into a country, but do not pursue the integration in their country of destination but rather the noninvolvement or isolation in/from the social and political life, which is considered impure or insignificant; In their case, the exercise of certain rights is considered to be optional and can be voluntarily curtailed. Examples are the orthodox Jews and the members of the Amish community. The *metics* (a term introduced by Kymlicka, inspired by the class of metics, inhabitants without citizenship rights in the Greek city-states from Antiquity) represents the class of denizens who do not have (and do not have the possibility to obtain) the citizenship and full political rights (mainly stateless residents and illegal workers). In their case, the unequal citizenship is due to the absence of some rights, even at the formal-legal level. The *racial castes* are those communities which along the time were discriminated and placed in position of inequality and dependency or subordination due to their racial and ethnic composition (like the Jews in the past, the blacks, the Roma).

As a terminological conclusion, following the ideas presented above and in connection with the term *multiculturalism*, a *multicultural context* (or state) is that in which many national minorities and/or ethnic groups co-exist, thus a state (or context) which is multinational, multiethnic or both. In such a multicultural context, the fact the ethnic and cultural minorities cannot organize their own culture in order to transform it into a national project peculiar to

themselves (a thing which is considered natural in the case of the majority), without assuming that this undertaking will necessarily lead to autonomy or secession, generates a situation of inequality between the majority and the minorities.

The author considers that this is one of the failures of the classical liberal vision and on the emphasis put by it solely on the individual rights and liberties. The disputation between *the individual* and *the collectivity*, or between the liberals and the communitarians was frequently brought into discussion in the approaches and references to the rights of the ethnic/cultural communities; in these instances, the proponents of a set of specific rights for the minorities insisted on those peculiar to the communities rather than to the individuals. These disputes became visible with the apparition in 1971 of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, and then with the critical reactions to it. Went through many stages (for an abbreviated and critical review, see Salat, 2001).

These distinctions could however become irrelevant, artificial or exaggerated when used in order to scrutinize the foundation of minority rights, an endeavor which is usually made by juxtaposing the rights of the individuals from a minority with the collective or community rights. According to Kymlicka, there are several individual rights which belong to and are exerted at the level of those who are a part of a community, such as the right to preserve one's identity, to use one's own language or to be exempted from some obligations. Similarly, the system of human (individual) rights and liberties includes many rights which are exerted collectively, their practice in common being what gives them their real meaning. From this area we can enumerate the right of free gathering and association, to which we can add the right of free worshipping/the religious freedom (the latter not being directly mentioned by Kymlicka), the first two being clearly non-peculiar to the ethnic-cultural minorities.

In conclusion, identifying the rights with one of the parts of the *individualism - collectivism* and/or *liberalism - communitarianism*

debate (more precisely with the collectivist and communitarian side) could be misleading. The phrase suggested by the author in this context, for further clarifying the things, is that of *minority rights*. In the same time, according to him, we must re-analyze and rephrase the assumption regarding the incompatibility between a liberal view on rights and liberties and the existence of the collective rights.

In what minority rights are concerned, there are two complementary but distinctive aspects which need to be analyzed: *the internal restriction* and *the external protection*. *The internal restrictions* are pointed on the self-perception and the self-image of the members of the community, and their expectations towards themselves, while *the external protection* regards their claims and vindications towards the majority society. The cases of conflict between the individual and the collective/communitary rights, which according to the critics of the collective rights would lead to the subordination of the former to the latter, are connected, somehow paradoxically, to the manifestation of the *internal restrictions*. Unlike the external protection, which regulate the situation of the requirements of the members of a minority from the society, *in the shape* - and *if* - they are formulated by the individuals (thus being dependent to their will and decision), the internal restrictions tend to place the individuals in a background stage, favoring the tradition, the common practices and the lifestyle of that particular community.

The instances in which the protection mechanisms of the minorities appeal to the collective rights are quite numerous nowadays, and Kymlicka divides them in three categories: *the rights to autonomy*, *the polyethnic rights* and *the rights to special representation*. *The rights to autonomy* might appear in several formulae (the most frequent being the federalist one) which envisage the allocation of a decisional latitude and to a degree of power and autonomy at the local or regional level, to the minority community or communities. This thing is usually obtained through a "division of labor" (sanctioned by the constitution) between the attributions of the central and the local governments.

The polyethnic rights are the rights and liberties which add to the “general” rights by protecting against discrimination and forced assimilation, without preventing the integration in the larger society of the individuals belonging to the minorities. Possible examples are the access to tuition in the mother tongue and to studying the own traditions in the public education institutions, or the support for maintaining, up to a certain level, the cultural distinctiveness. A distinct sub-category of these is represented by the exemption of the members of the minority groups from the fulfilling of some restrictions and obligations, or by singularizing these in accord to the requirements of their culture and religion (for example, accepting the right to wear a turban as a part of the military uniform, in the armed forces or in the police, for some groups, or exempting the members of the traditional Jewish community from following the rules of humane sacrificing for the animals).

As far as *the rights to special representation* are concerned, they usually regard those groups and communities which had suffer long periods of restraining and under-representation in the past, or for which the access to rights and representation is considered to be more important than their statistical weight in the present. We can exemplify these by ensuring the right of representation for the indigenous population in the constitution of several states, or by granting the access in the parliament for the minorities in Romania, even if their candidates failed to obtain a number of votes equal to the electoral coefficient, in post-1991 Romania.

The theory of multicultural citizenship, or the liberal foundation of the minority rights, is built on two pillars: first, that the minority rights build a frame which makes possible the actual and practical effects of the individual rights and liberties, and second that the specific (minority) rights can ensure equality between the members of the majority and those of the minority groups. Thus Kymlicka set himself not only to eliminate the perceived difference between the individual liberalism and the minority rights, conceived as being collective, but also to reconcile the two perspectives, by

demonstrating that the minority rights can be founded on premises which are perfectly acceptable for liberalism.

The connection between the individual freedom and the cultural belonging is given by the fact that the rational, free, autonomous individuals in search for their own way by exerting their capacity to choose and to alter their initial options do not live in a cultural vacuum or in an abstract space. They are living in a preexistent cultural environment, which embeds the tradition and the slices of collective life of that community, and it is only normal that their vision of good to be expressed (and restated) in that particular frame, by choosing, modifying or rejecting existent models or projects of life.

Without this particular context, which is given by birth, or rather by blocking the access to it, the decisional capacity of the individual is fragmented or obstructed, as some of the models of behavior became inaccessible, the natural path of socializing within the own culture being deviated. In the absence of the alternatives which are culturally embodied and defined and not a set of abstractions, the freedom of individual option became invalid. The culture at which the author is referring in this context is the society culture, the one which mediates, intermediate contents, offer guidance but is not dense enough in order to constrain. It encourages the choice but it also makes possible the rejection or reappraisal of its own contents, its existence but also its "thinness" (Salat, 2001, pag. 161) making possible the individual freedom.

The citizens' access to their own society culture should hence be considered a fundamental good. A concrete proof in this sense is, according to Kymlicka, the fact that the process of modernization and liberalization which took place in many countries in the XXth century did not erase or diminish the cultural affiliations from within those societies, but on the contrary was accompanied by a process of updating and growth regarding those. The equality between the communities, as well as the connection between the individual liberties and the cultural environment, can also be supported by *the existence of the historical (international) treaties,*

concluded in the past and regarding the minority issue (they playing rather a moral role in the present, like the agreement between Italy and Austria regarding the Southern Tyrol), and by an analysis which emphasize precisely the benefits of multiculturalism for a society tout ensemble.

The utmost importance is given by the author to the requirement of observing the principle of equality, very important for the liberal thinking as long as it does not lead to equalization. It refers to the fact that, in a multicultural society (multinational or multiethnic) in which the society culture of the majority is implicitly institutionalized (national anthem, national holyday, official language, founding myths, etc) the members of the minority community/communities must develop a supplementary effort and invest more than the majority for ensuring a set of rights which are granted for the latter. Thus, it is necessary that the equal access to one's own culture for the members of the minority to be supported by both communities (minority and majority), as it is the case for the members of the majority; this all the more so as the belonging to a minority or to a majority is a fact given by birth and not a chosen or achieved condition, and (as said before) having access to one's cultural belonging is a necessary and useful circumstance for exerting the individual rights.

The statement regarding the benefits brought by the multiculturalism for the society in its thoroughness invokes the positive effects of the high number of alternatives available for choice, alternatives encompassing narratives, traditions, projects and visions of society which are available for all to choose. In this way the "market" of the existent alternatives grows larger and richer, and at this point Kymlicka makes an analogy between the civil and political rights which, notwithstanding their universal character and motivation, are granted by a state to his own citizens (among all the individuals), and the minority rights, which are directed to those who, belonging to a minority culture, do need them.

Ethnic groups and minorities – basic concepts

In Romanian, the most frequently used term in order *to define the ethno-cultural minorities* (annex 1, p. 1) is that of *minorities*, or *national minorities*. Other similar terms – either synonymous or alternative to that – are ethnic group, ethnic minority, cultural minority, nationality, even diaspora in some contexts.

It is relatively difficult to establish a full and closed list with the defining characteristics for an ethno-cultural community, all the more so as when such a collective entity is defined we are dealing with two perspectives, which are not every time congruent. Thus, on the one hand, we have the *prescribed definition*, which, making use of the perception of the others – either the rest of the society from the country in which the minority lives or that from “the mother-country” – tries to make use of objective and perceivable features. On the other hand, in the case of each ethno-cultural community we also have to deal with the perception about the self, about the own identity – the self-perception or the *self/assumed definition*. The manner in which the two are articulated together, by combining, competing or even entering into conflict with one another, is the way in which the border of the respective community are drawn. Actually, both *the prescribed* and *the assumed* definition use both objective features (physical and socio-cultural) *and* interpretations. The physical features can be the race, the common origin, the belonging to a given territory; at the core of the socio-cultural ones we have the language, and alongside it there might stand the common tradition, religion or culture of that community. The assumed definition uses mainly the same characteristics, but it is the interpretation the one which identifies the elements which differentiates the members of the group from the rest and those who bind them together. In this regard the history functions as a source for the common myths, the (shared) culture and territory can generate the feeling of common belonging, and the origins, tradition, religion and mostly the language may serve as mobilizing factors for that community.

For circumscribing the phrase *ethno-cultural community* and its synonyms even more closely it is also important to stipulate what they *do not mean*, in order to specify the term in its logical field. Thus we can speak of *nation* (the supra-ordinate logical notion), which could be operationally defined as that (ethno)cultural community which has reached the stage of modern statehood and of *ethnic group, people, population* or *indigenous population* (the logical subordinated notions) whose members share common features without being completely aware of that or without being mobilized on those issues – lacking exactly that type of perception about their own identity which leads to constituting a self-aware ethno-cultural community.

In the same time it important to avoid the terminological confusions. *The ethno-cultural communities/the national minorities* are not the same thing as *the statistical minorities, the sociological minorities, the subcultures* or *the lifestyle minorities/lifestyle enclaves*. Any number of elements fewer than the majority from an aggregate is a *statistical minority*. A *sociological minority* refers to a class of underprivileged individuals from a society or a social context, and whose physical or cultural characteristics are different from those of the dominant group (Abraham, Bădescu, Chelcea, 1995). A sociological minority can be minority or majoritary from the statistical perspective, the defining feature being its status of a discriminated group; a classical example in this regard is that of the black population from South Africa during the Apartheid system.

In the case of *the subcultures* or *the lifestyle enclaves* (Kymlicka 1995a), the line between these and *the ethno-cultural communities* is more fluid. The first one implies the existence of the feeling of common belonging, but there's no ethnical binding (either physical or cultural) between its members. The second encompass an even more restricted sphere; thus an ethno-cultural community can include several such enclaves, which in their turn can recruit members transgressing the borders of the community.

As motives for ethnical mobilization and conflict, the literature advances several theses and theories. In his monumental work *Ethnic*

Groups in Conflict, D. Horowitz expounds three such hypotheses: *the modernization*, *the economics* and *the cultural pluralism*. According to the first, the pre-existent communities enters into conflict because *the process of modernization* draws them closer in the area of the intended objectives and goals, thus generating a situation of competition and conflict for the same type of material or symbolic resources, on the same market. *The economics hypothesis* emphasize the material motivations of the ethnic conflict, be they in the form of a competition for goods between the existent groups, or between the groups (and their competing elites) themselves – such as the conflict between the minorities' and the majority elites, the latter controlling the state – or simply as an attempt of hiding the issues and rivalries which are really important under the mask of the ethnicity. Finally, the third hypothesis, which is that of *the pluralism*, underlines the prevalence, among different communities, of different, conflicting or incompatible visions and sets of values. The fact that these might exceed and dominate the set of common values, and the tendency of each group to create a coherent institutional system on their basis are the elements with lead to conflict.

T. R. Gurr and B. Harf, in their study *Minorities at Risk* identify another three sets of theories of ethnic mobilization and conflict. These are for the most part consistent with Horowitz' hypotheses. In the same time, both Gurr and Horowitz emphasize that it is very difficult to consider any theory/hypothesis as being exhaustive (Salat, 2001, pp. 26-27, 33). Gurr brings forth *the primordialist*, *the instrumentalist* and (the one which he shares) *the constructivist* approach (Gurr, 1997). The proponents of *the primordialism* assert that the process of modernization did not produce a weakening of the ethnic and cultural commitments of the communities; the reality proves that these sets of values, myths and primordial narratives have been preserved and/or are even reactivated in the present. The *instrumentalist* perspective is somehow opposite, maintaining that the ethnicity-related value contents and goals are in fact instruments, subservient to the real goals and interests which are of economic nature or prestige and power-connected (the later available for the elites of the communities).

The constructivism appears to be situated at the confluence between the previous two approaches, subsuming the points that they might have in common. Thus, the ethno-cultural mobilization is determined by both the existence of primordial values, which might differ from a community to another, and by a background of economic competition or rivalry for symbolical goods which amplifies the former, going in some cases as far as stigmatizing the competitor/opponent.

In the literature from the field there are a series of typologies relating to *the classification of the ethno-cultural communities*; they are elaborated using different criteria, so their unification seem to be a difficult task. One of the extended typologies belongs to T. R Gurr and B. Harf (Gurr, 1997), which enumerates *the ethno-nationalist groups or communities, the indigenous or native peoples, the elites acting in the name of ethnic or cultural minorities, the ethno-classes and the religious minorities which are politically active*. The last are not considered a category in itself, because the research of the two authors demonstrates that *the confessional differences per se, without being corroborated with other factors*, play a secondary role in the activation of the ethnic conflicts.

The ethno-nationalist groups (or communities) are relatively important numerically, differentiating from the majority by physical or cultural traits, having historical experiences (closer or more distant in the past) of statehood or autonomy, experiences with fuel their political actions in the present. Their goal is to achieve a larger autonomy or even independence by secession. Examples: the Scottish, the Welsh, the Basques, the Croats and the Slovenes from the former SFR of Yugoslavia.

The phrase *indigenous or native peoples* characterize the autochthonous population from the colonies, which kept for a long time the traditional way of life (agriculture, animal breeding) and mobilize politically only at a later time, after World War I. Their claims are mostly connected with the ownership right over the land needed in

order to continue their traditional living. Typical examples are the Native Americans from USA and Canada, the Aborigines from Australia and the Maoris from the New Zealand.

The elites acting in the name of ethnic or cultural minorities (in original, *communal contenders* - Gurr, 1997) are the representatives of the communities which do not aim chiefly for an enlarged autonomy or independence but for the access and participation in the decisional sphere of the "host society", usually within the limits of the existing rules of the game. The difference between these and the ethno-nationalist groups might not be too marked, as Gurr and Salat emphasized in their volumes (Gurr, 1997; Salat, 2001). An example on these lines, in my opinion, is that of the Hungarian minority from Romania, whose leaders, in competition or in concert, strive for both type of finalities, alternately or concomitantly.

The ethnoclasses comprise those groups which have the relatively homogeneous character of a social class or stratum, this status being usually transmitted from one generation to another. The author mentions two types of ethnoclasses, *the minorities which can be differentiated by the physical traits* and *the dominant minorities*. The first are in an inexpedient economical and status position, usually effused (and not concentrated within a given area) in the home-country and are fighting for putting an end to the discrimination and for equal rights. Visible examples of such minorities are the blacks from the United States and the Turks from Germany. The dominant minorities have a privileged status in society and aim at its preservation; examples are the whites from South Africa, during the Apartheid system, and the members of Saddam Hussein's clan from the Tikrit region of Iraq, during the Saddam era.

In a previous section of this article I have presented, rather extensively, the typology of the ethno-cultural communities realized by Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka 1995a, Kymlicka 1995b). The elements of the typology are not going to be reproduced here. I shall only emphasize, that defining multiculturalism (and circumscribing, at the conceptual level, what a multicultural state and/or society are),

the Canadian author starts from the characteristics of the groups which compose a society, their features and the form of interactions between them determining the type of the latter. Thus, there might be *multicultural states and societies* which are either *multinational* (those in which the majority lives together with at least a national minority – one with a network of active institutions and with a state-building or selfgovernment experience in the past) or *multiethnic* (whithin which there is at least one minority ethnic group, usually constituted through immigration).

A reversed perspective is offered by D. Abraham, I. Bădescu and S. Chelcea in their volume *Interethnic Relations in Romania (1995)*, their classification being built starting from the type of state and its organizational format – something which apparently makes them susceptible of formalism. Notwithstanding, they consider that the minorities are firstly defined by the space they live in; a defining role is played by the relations which are established between them, within this space. Because of the importance given to the spacial-territorial component, the authors divide the ethnic groups into *ethnic communities* (those living inside a unitary state) and *national communities* (the ones inhabiting a federal state).

For clasifying *the types of nationalism (state-building models) and the strategies of multicultural communities* several classifications are used. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan² use a schematic model which classes and sub-classes results from combining the nation-building strategies with the state-building strategies – used during the transition from the pre-national political entities to the national states. Thus we can have, one the one hand, unifying and differentiating nation-building strategies (NBS), and territorial and non-territorial state-building strategies (SBS) on the other, both of which can be inclusive or exclusive. From their intersection we have the following set of possible situations:

² Linz, Stepan (editors), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, Est Africa and Post-Communist Europe*, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore-London, 1996 - in Zellner *apud* Salat, 2001, pp. 48-49.

- Unifying NBS and non-territorial inclusive SBS → assimilation
- Unifying NBS and SBS non-territorială exclusive SBS → expulsion, emigration
- Unifying NBS and SBS territorial exclusive SBS → secession, partition
- Differentiating NBS and non-territorial inclusive SBS → ethno-cultural equilibrium
- Differentiating NBS and non-territorial exclusive SBS → isolation
- Differentiating NBS and territorial inclusive SBS → territorial autonomy
- Differentiating NBS and territorial exclusive SBS → the formation of a confederation

As a conclusion (*apud* Salat, 2001, p. 49), the more the state-building and the nation-building options of the majority and of the minorities differs, the more the risk of an ethnic conflict grows. Another classification regarding the types of nationalism and the strategies adopted by various communities was developed by J. Snyder (Snyder, 2000, pp. 69-70). The mentioned classification includes four types of nationalism: *ethnic, civic, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary*.

The ethnic nationalism is articulated starting from the common language, religion, culture, traditions of a group, but also from the common history or from a common foundational myth; these criteria are used for include (or exclude) members in (or from) the respective community. Example in this sense are the Hungarian and the Romanian nationalism.

The civic nationalism is derived from the attachment and loialty of the members of a community to a set of political institutions and ideas existent in that group/society, which are percieved as being just and efficient. The belonging to the group is determined by birth or residence (for an extended period) within the borders of the nation. As examples we can mention the English and the American nationalism.

The revolutionary nationalism mobilizes starting from the ideas of a revolution meant to install to power a political regime which should govern in the name of the nations and exclude those who oppose to this endeavour. Here Snyder gives the example of the French revolution (Snyder, 2001, p. 70), to which we can add the examples of the revolutions from Romanian Principalities and Transylvania in 1848 and the Hungarian revolution from the same year.

In opposition, *the counter-revolutionary nationalism* builds upon an appeal to resistance from the internal factions and actors – be they religious denominations, social classes or other ethnic groups – which, aiming at a change, are undermining the traditional national institutions; hence, the former are considered enemies of the nation. To exemplify we have the cases of the German nationalism, from the period preceding World War One – according to Snyder – to which we can add those of the Austrian and Hungarian nationalisms during the dualistic Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. Snyder emphasize that all these categories are ideal-types, and it is to be expected that in the real cases the situation is far more complex.

The next typology belongs to M. Brown (Brown, 2000, chap.VII), which mentions *the civic, the ethno-cultural and the multicultural nationalism*. The *civic nationalism* starts from a common vision on citizenship and on type of commitment, contractualism and loyalty which are required by the life in a community composed by equal citizens. It is disinterested in the physical and cultural differences among the members of various groups, and follows everyone's *integration* in the majority society they live in. The *ethno-cultural nationalism* gives importance to the existence of a collective foundational myth, and to the belief that the members of that community impart a set of racial, linguistic and religious attributes which demonstrate their common origin. Those who do not share these features from birth can however achieve them through assimilation (for example by the way of marriage or religious conversion), the problem of cultural diversity being "solved" this way. The *multicultural nationalism* – a paradoxical, apparently

oxymoronic collocation, fact accepted even by the author (Brown, 2000, p. 128) – is, according to him, a cosmopolitan sort of patriotism, trying to build a society upon a comprehensive type of social justice, which *encourages* and *promotes* the diversity. Such a community, inspired by the ideal of *the unity in diversity*, should further the collective rights for all the minorities, in parallel with the values of common belonging and equity.

Once we have reached this point, and in order to close the circle of our review, inherently selective, of the classifications regarding the species of nationalism, we should get back to the term *multiculturalism*. Therefore, according to Hollinger (*apud* Salat, 2001, pp. 94-95), there are two forms the *multicultural policies* can take: *the pluralist multiculturalism* and *the cosmopolitan multiculturalism*.

The pluralist multiculturalism presupposes a set of policies which take into consideration and are aimed to the ethno-cultural groups seen as permanent and durable entities and subjects of the collective rights, emphasizing on preserving the characteristics inherited from the past and keeping intact the borders between groups. *The cosmopolitan multiculturalism*, on the other hand, is directed towards the individuals, accentuating their capacity and right of free choice, and, implicitly, the dynamic and changeful nature of the various groups.

I will end the current review of the types of nationalisms, and of the present section of the article, by bringing in a classification from a less known study (but one possessing the qualities of a good work of synthesis) having D. Abraham, I. Bădescu and S. Chelcea as authors (Abraham, Bădescu, Chelcea, 1995). These, in regard to the attitudes of the ethnic groups, talk about *cosmopolitanism*, *ethnocentrism*, *pluralism/cultural relativism* and *interculturality*. I will briefly discuss each of them further in the article.

The cosmopolitanism rejects the primacy of the ethnic identification, which is considered anachronistic, behind the times or at least of secondary importance. The modern individual is considered “a citizen of the Universe”, and the ethnic-based differences are either

irrelevant or are losing importance. In support of this model (existent, in the utopian version, in the political philosophy since its very beginning) came, according to the authors, the relatively recent phenomenon of globalization and the evolutions connected to it.

The ethnocentrism is disinterested in the peculiarities, values and even in the existence of the other (up to the point of rejection), gives a secondary value to the concord between various ethnic groups and tends towards isolation and rejection of coequality. This type of attitude can have different degrees of intensity, from rather moderate forms at the bottom of the scale up to radical ones to the top of it.

The pluralism/the cultural relativism is an approach originated in the cultural anthropology which highlights the fact that there is no such thing as a unique or universal culture, but a multitude of cultures, each with its foundation and justification, which are equally valid. According to it, the indispensable interpretative key for understanding the values of the individuals is their own culture.

The interculturality – which is the perspective favored by the three authors – is a type of attitude that, without denying or neglecting the importance of one's own values, is based upon an imperative of circulation of values, of interethnic cooperation, communication and mutual respect. According to this model "the other", although different, has the status of a real partner. We can ascertain that this approach is, at least partly, an ideal one, including a noticeable normative/prescriptive component.

A model and its operationalization

According to the 2002 and 2011 Romanian censuses, the most numerically important minorities living in Romania are the Hungarian and the Roma communities. In the official statistics, they numbered 6,60% (1.431.807 Hungarians) and 2,46% (535.140 Roma) from a total of 21.680.974 inhabitants of the country in 2002, respectively 6,50% (1.227.600 Hungarians) and 3,30% (621.600 Roma)

from a total of 20.212.600³. The difference in statistical terms between the first two (most manifold) and the rest of minority groups is a very marked one, each of these (and all summed up together) representing a sub-unitary figure. Thus, the third community is the Ukrainian (0,28% - 61.098 inhabitants/0,20% - 50.900 inhabitants)⁴, the fourth the German (0,27% - 59.764 inhabitants/0,20% - 36.000 inhabitants) and then follows, in order, the Lipovan Russians, the Turks, the Tatars, the Serbs, the Slovaks (each with under 40.000 components) and another groups with under 10.000 members. In the same time the Romanian majority group amounts to 89,47%, with 19.399.597 residents/88,9% with 16.792.900 residents⁵.

In territory, the Roma population is rather evenly dispersed, while the Hungarians are in majority concentrated in Transylvania, Crişana and Banat. The only region where the Hungarians are the majority community is constituted by the area of the former medieval "Szeklers' seats" (also sometimes called "Szeklers' land", "Székelyföld" in Hungarian, "Ținutul secuiesc" or "Secuime" in Romanian) from the center of the country (the current Covasna and Harghita counties, and the central and Eastern part of Mureş county). This zone was inhabited by 668.471 Hungarians in 2002, and the number decreased to 609.033 in 2011 (following the general tendency of the population of Romania, but on a slower rate than the rest of the Hungarian community from the country), which represented less than 46,69% in 2002, respectively less than 49,6% in 2011 (if we take into consideration the population from the entire Mureş county) from the total number of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania.

We should note that the inhabitants of the area are frequently identified as *Szeklers*, but this ethnonim did not figure among the preset categories which were present (as close-answer questions) in

³ We must note a decrease in the total number of the stable population with 1.559.300 from 2002 to 2011.

⁴ According to the 2002/respective 2011 Romanian censuses.

⁵ For the differences in the methodology between the 2002 and the 2011 census, see http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REZULTATE-DEFINITIVE-RPL_2011.pdf, p. 5

the 2002 and 2011 censuses; with regard of ethnicity, they rather consider themselves as being a distinct subcategory within the Hungarian community. As denomination, they are in vast majority Catholics, unlike the rest of Hungarians from Romania among which the Protestants (Calvinists, Lutherans and Unitarians) predominate.

When we try to apply and to operationalize the set of concepts and the theories prevalent in the field of interethnic relations, presented in the previous part of the paper, we see that, in accordance with T. R. Gurr and B. Harf classification regarding *the types of ethno-cultural communities* (Gurr, 1997), *the Hungarian community* has both the features of *an ethno-cultural group* (articulated in the manifestos and strategies of the various political and non-political organization, seeking to preserve the own tradition, culture and specific rights of that minority, even at the institutional level) and of *the communal contenders* (who, organized in competitive political parties, aim at the mobilization of the community in order to be able to secure their own access to resources at to the political establishment, with its ensemble of public offices).

A legitimate question which may arise would be if both political organizations of the ethnic Hungarians (RMDS/UDMR – Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, and MPP/PCM – Hungarian Civic Party) pursue the entrance to the central government, and whether MPP/PCM isn't the conveyor of a more locally or regionally circumscribed political message, specific to the areas inhabited by the Hungarians. On the other hand, in the case of *the Roma community* it is quite clear that the characteristics of *an ethnoclass* are applicable.

As stated by Abraham, Bădescu and Chelcea (1995), the nature of the two communities should have been determined by the way in which their space of inhabitation is organized at the national level, and by the way in which the minorities interact with this – both of them being, consequently, *ethnic minorities living in a unitary state*. There is no doubt that such a phrase could be questioned in the case of the Hungarian community from the perspective of its self/assumed definition and by the way in which its elites are relating to the own culture and to their homeland.

In regard *to the types of nationalism and the strategies followed* by the two minorities, the margin of interpretation is even larger. According to the complex model of Linz and Stepan (1996), resulted from the combination of nation-building strategies (NBS) and state-building strategies (SBS), in the case of the Hungarians predominates *a combination between a differentiating nation-building strategy and an inclusive territorial state-building strategy*, resulting a drive towards the autonomy of the community. In the case of the Roma, we have *a unifying nation-building strategy combined with non-territorial inclusive state-building strategy*, generating as a consequence the assimilation.

In the same time, on the agenda of the ethno-cultural policy undertakings inspired by the Romanian majority, part of them transformed into public policies of the state, we have mainly *strategies of the differentiating nation-building type, combined with non-territorial inclusive state-building approaches* (having as result the ethno-cultural equilibrium) in regard to the Hungarians, corroborated with *a mix between a unifying nation-building strategy and a non-territorial inclusive state-building strategy* concerning the other minorities. Discussing on the subject of the potential of conflict contained by the existence of various strategies of the different ethnic/national communities, we should note that even if these are dissimilar, they are not necessarily reciprocally exclusive, as to generate irreconcilable differences between the visions of society and the projects for the future of the respective communities.

In accordance to J. Snyder and D. Brown typologies (Snyder, 2000; Brown, 2000), if we would compare the Hungarian and Romanian ethnic groups from Romania we would be dealing with *an ethnic nationalism* in the case of the former and *with a combination of ethnic nationalism with visible elements of civic nationalism* in the case of the latter (examples of measures of the civic nationalism type: the inclusion of the collective rights in the Constitution, in the form of special stipulations for electing the representatives of the ethnic communities in the Parliament, and even the usage, in the Constitutions and in other official documents of the state of the

phrase *national minorities*)⁶. Furthermore, in the vision about the interethnic relations of the majority community and in some sets of public policies we can find *elements of multicultural nationalism*, promoting the unity in diversity (Brown, 2000, p. 208). Contingent upon the Roma, we are dealing with the situation of *a community which is yet weakly mobilized ethno-culturally* and which, together with a drive for the conservation of its own tradition, is aiming at the elimination of discrimination (which is mostly situational discrimination, the institutional one being banned by the laws of Romania) and the integration in society.

The mentioned multiculturalism is rather of a pluralist type (Hollinger *apud* Salat, 2001, pp. 94-95), having as landmarks the existent communities, their characteristics and the affiliation of individuals to them. There are, however, present, several *elements of the cosmopolitan pluralism*.

Likewise, using the classification of Abraham, Bădescu and Chelcea (1995), in the case of the Romanians and the Hungarians we can identify *a merger of the moderate ethnocentric attitudes with the pluralist ones* (although with *a radicalized ethnocentrism* present in certain contexts – such as that of the Hungarians from Covasna and Harghita counties). We have the same mixture as regards to the Roma community. In addition, the debates and disagreements among, on the one hand, the representatives of the establishment, of the Romanian political and civil society, on the one hand, and of the Hungarian elites and civil society on the other directed the discussion about certain disputed symbols, and about a certain level of institutionalization of some rights (required by the Hungarians) towards the usage of the arguments from the area of *interculturality*. A concrete situation, connected with the right to superior education in the mother tongue, concerned the disputation involving the intercultural tradition of “Babeş-Bolyai” University *versus* the request for the foundation of a Hungarian-language state university.

⁶ Art. 62, paragraph 2 and art. 6, paragraph 1 from the Constitution of Romania.

If we try to apply the conceptual frame constructed by Kymlicka to the given reality, we learn that we have a *multicultural society environment (multinational and multiethnic)*, with a *national minority* having a mother-country and a tradition of autonomy and statehood in the past (the Hungarians) *and a community situated at the intersection between a racial cast and an ethnic group* – to which we must add a lengthy tradition of living within the given territory (the Roma people).

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The normative model presented by the same author starts with de-structuring the myth of the ethno-cultural neutrality of the state and assumes an acceptance of the bindings between the individual rights and the culture of one's own group/community, and an extended autonomy, at all the levels, of the minority communities in order to answer the challenge of equality between these.

Whereas we can find arguments in this sense in the image about the self and about the other employed by the ethno-cultural communities from Romania, there are several aspects which require a particular attention. Thus, it is noticeable that the Romanian state and the majority culture, in the interaction with the distinctive set of requirements and representations of the two most manifold minorities, have difficulties in issuing a single and thorough message to address the ethno-cultural matters. Also, different interpretations can be generated by the statistical reality that the majority of the Hungarians from Romania live in areas where they do not enjoy the status of the majority, hence for them the territorial autonomy on ethnic bases cannot be a solution.

Last but not least, in the contention about the national symbols between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority different perceptions and interpretations about the own symbols (and about the symbols of the other) are brought forth. Thus, if on the one hand the demythification of the Romanian history is expected, on the other there is a tendency to preserve the myths of the Hungarian history, which are considered as being part of the past and of the tradition of the community. However, these are perceived

by the majority as symbols of an oppressive regime from the past of their living in Transylvania, during which the Romanian majority had the status of an *ethnoclass*.

Moreover, the requests regarding a Hungarian state university (given the situation in which a functioning public network of the superior education in Hungarian language, comprising all the academic fields, already exists under the aegis of the principle of academic autonomy), or the institutionalization of an ethnic-based territorial autonomy in the Szeklers' land (while a real and quite extensive level of autonomy, practiced by the local officials elected by the Hungarians - which are constituting the majority group in Covasna and Harghita counties - is already workable since early 1990's) may be regarded as being excessive by the Romanian elites. This can happen as they are perceived as denying an already existent tradition (that of *interculturality*, at the university education level), for the reason they could generate new problems for the Romanian ethnics who have minority status in the counties with a Hungarian majority (among which some claim to be underrepresented), or because they represent only a particular and local solution, instead of a general one (the majority of the Hungarians in Romania living outside that area).

As well, the symbolic and strategic role of RMDS/UDMR's repeated participation in Romanian central government, in different legislations and as minor partner in both left and right leaning coalitions was emphasized by commentators from both Romanian political parties and civil society, and propounded as a symptom and an assurance for the existence of the minority rights in Romania. However, according to some, the same fact was, throughout the time, downplayed as significance by the exponents of their own ethnic community.

Even if the merits of W. Kymlicka's analysis and suggested solutions would consist only of highlighting and explaining the above-mentioned peculiarities of a mixed ethno-cultural society, they could be considered as being beneficial for the understanding of such

complex realities. It is yet for certain, at least partly, that his normative-prescriptive insight will echo in the solution the future will bring forth to the ethno-cultural disputes and issues.

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