THE ROLE OF THE UNPBF IN THE POSTWAR RECOVERY OF FRAGILE STATES

A Qualitative comparative analysis of UNPBF- supported initiatives in African countries

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Abstract
Peacebuilding is an experimental field and the impact of international measure implemented in war-torn contexts is often difficult to assess. This article provides a QCA analysis of the impact of five key-dimensions of the UNPBF in African states, aiming to investigate whether the path to stability can consist of single independent measures or if it is the result of their combined effect.

Keywords: peacebuilding, UNPBF, conflict, stability, qualitative analysis.

Introduction

There is a complex array of humanitarian, political, economic and cultural issues involved in the remaking of a torn society (Meernik and Mason 2006). Fragile states are often trapped in a cycle of poverty and violence, prone to internal unrest and to repeated lapses into conflict. Postwar reconstruction mechanisms must therefore cover a large array of issues – from peacebuilding and the need of reconciliation and healing, to reconstruction social and economic infrastructure destroyed in the war – as well as addressing crucial issues of self-governance, in the context of governance gaps or in the best-case scenarios, a transitional government.

Considerable efforts have been mobilised to help with postwar reconstruction of fragile states, seen as both the responsibility of national actors, and of the international community. Scholars and practitioners have been looking at how war cessation once achieved can result in sustained peace (Paris 1997; Busumtwsi-Sam 2004; McCandless 2008). The United Nations (UN) is only one of several actors to support postwar countries to succeed in their efforts to build peace. In 2006, after years of evaluation and learning from experiences in postwar recovery and recognizing the complexity and difficulties involved in contributing to building sustainable peace, the UN took the step of establishing a number of key institutional capabilities – architecture – to strengthen its support for postwar recovery

and peacebuilding. This included the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), the Peace Support Office (UNPBSO) and UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF). This paper seeks to focus on one of these instruments – the UNPBF – and to understand the contribution it is making to postwar recovery in fragile states.

The UNPBF was created to address the gap in the early stages of postwar recovery and peacebuilding, immediately following the conclusion of a peace agreement, when action to sustain an official ceasefire is vital and resources from other mechanisms may not yet available[1]. While not purely developmental, UNPBF is meant to have a catalytic effect in helping to bring about other, more sustained support mechanisms, such as longer term engagements by development agencies and bilateral donors. Therefore, UNPBF provides what Busumtwi-Sam calls *the third development window*, filling the gap between humanitarian emergency measures and conventional development initiatives. The same author notes that a successful transition from war to peace requires a re-conceptualization of development, distinct from humanitarian and conventional development, to address explicitly the causes and consequences of war (Busumtwi-Sam 2004, 316), in light of the data according to which 22 of Africa's 53 countries in a postwar situation faced challenges in building peace.

The context of the present paper considers peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict – transition from war to peace - and sets out five basic principles and features which have proven by the UN to be relevant across different countries. The five UNPBF - supported initiatives are – in the framework of the paper – causal conditions in 12 specific fragile states, which aim to build relative stability: Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoros, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. The analysis will enable to conclude which of the causal conditions – or combinations of – lead to the success or failure in ensuring the outcome: relative stability and prevent relapse into violent conflict.

The methodology chosen is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA presupposes good theoretical knowledge of the cases chosen for analysis as well as a good knowledge of the relationships between the conditions. The

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[1] More information available at < http://www.unpbf.org> 2012, January 31

method is sensitive the context, as well as allowing for a case-oriented approach to explain the link between theory, cases and outcome.

The structure of the paper follows the steps of: 1) Theoretical framework: defining the concepts of state fragility, peacebuilding and UN-driven peacebuilding 2). Operational framework: the methodology chosen for analysis will be justified and explained. Variables will be defined and quantified; analysis operations will be explained 3) Analysis of data will be executed through the fs/QCA and Tosmana software[2]. Conclusions are drawn at the end.

Theoretical framework:
Defining concepts
State fragility and failure
There is no internationally agreed definition of the term *fragile state*; most development agencies refer to a fundamental failure of the state in performing the basic functions to meet citizens' needs and expectations. Gradually starting from this point, failure is marked by a collapse of central government authority to impose order, resulting in loss of physical control of territory and loss of monopoly over the use of force, in the Weberian sense.

In this context, poorly performing or failed states often contribute to domestic humanitarian crisis which may also have impacts on neighbouring countries and at the regional and global levels (through humanitarian catastrophes, mass migration, war, rise in criminal violence, piracy, etc)
Fragile states are frequently trapped in a cycle of poverty and violence; they are prone to internal unrest and to repeated lapses into conflict: Junne and Verkoren characterize war in the recent decade as the best predictor of future large-scale violence in half of the cases (Junne and Verkoren 2005, 1). A World Bank Report shows that 44% of all postwar situations resume in the first five years after violence has stopped, unless specific measures are taken (World Bank 2004, 8). Such measures are analysed in the present

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[2] For the readers unfamiliar with the method, please see a general presentation of QCA <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/> 2011, November 10; Tosmana is a tool for Small-N Analysis and is used to conduct research on a few cases. More details are available at: < http://www.tosmana.net/> 2011, November 10

paper, encompassed in the concept of peacebuilding, aimed to resolve war-driving factors and avoid relapse into violent conflict.

Peacebuilding
Originating in Johan Galtung's peace studies work of the 1970s, the concept of peacebuilding was defined by its author as "promoting sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflict and support indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution" (Galtung 1976). The concept gained the attention of practitioners of conflict issues in the following decades and received widespread attention at the end of the Cold War.

Throughout the next decades, the concept of peacebuilding underwent a series of transformations in its usage by the UN. In 1992, the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali referred to peacebuilding as one of the series of tools for preventive diplomacy, defining it as an "action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict" (UN Agenda for Peace 1992). Peacebuilding was identified as one of the ways in which the UN should respond to conflict at the end of the Cold War – recognizing the limitations of peacekeeping as then practiced, in ensuring a lasting peace.

Peacebuilding has subsequently evolved to encompass *a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing and relapsing into conflict, by strengthening the national capacity at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development* (Secretary General's Policy Committee 2007). Conceptually the UN and its various agencies and components begin to move towards situating peacebuilding within a *comprehensive approach* to addressing violent conflict and instability. The 2009 *Report of the SG on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (i) sets out the basic principles and features which have proven to be relevant across different countries and (ii) positions peacebuilding as crucial in approaches to assist countries in the transitional period.

In UN jargon the *conflict* is often synonymous to *war*. This paper will seek to apply more rigorous conceptual clarity, addressing war / postwar, with 'war' defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year"[3].

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[3] The definition belongs to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UN – driven peacebuilding

Building peace is the responsibility of national actors, but the international community plays a critical role. The UN is one of several actors to support postwar countries to succeed in their efforts to build peace[4]. The UN's most significant peacebuilding architecture was established in 2005, following a commitment to provide sustained attention and make resources available for peacebuilding, while ensuring coherence of policies and effectiveness of initiatives. Part of the architecture, the UNPBF created a framework to address challenges that postwar countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of war (defined as the first two years after a main violent conflict in a country has ended). Concretely, UNPBF supports interventions that are believed to be critical to the peacebuilding process, directly contributing to the stabilization of countries emerging from conflict.

The Fund is designed to support several countries simultaneously in addressing critical gaps in peacebuilding that are underserved by other initiatives and actors or where no other funding mechanism is available (TOR PBF 2006)[5]. This study is limited to analysing failed and fragile states served by the UNPBF's Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) which aims to deliver peacebuilding and recovery support to countries with a certain profile (please see below to the argument for choice of case studies), in the shape of longer term financing (three years).

Operational framework
Methodology and operationalization

The QCA method of research chosen to analyse the data allows exploring which conditions and combinations of conditions support the realization of the outcome. QCA presupposes good theoretical knowledge of the cases chosen for analysis as well as a good knowledge of the relationships between variables. The method is sensitive the context, as well as allowing a case-oriented approach to explain the link between theory, cases and outcome. The conditions are referred to as independent variables, whereas the outcome is the dependent variable. The method operates with binary variables with two values -1 and 0 – thus each case can be characterised

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[4] Other sources for funding for peacebuilding efforts are the World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund (WM SPF) or the European Commission's instrument for Stability

[5] Please see page 8, footnote 14 on the Declared Objectives mentioned in the Terms of Reference (TOR)

across variables as either "in" (1) or "out" (0)[6]. Each independent variable is noted by a letter: A, B, C, etc. It is possible to show the presence or absence of the variable as a causal condition of the outcome, by capitalizing the letter in the case of presence – *A*, whereas *a* signals the absence and is read as NON A.

The logical operators are AND, OR and NON, expressed in the following way:
AND expressed by *; for example *A*B* or *AB*
OR expressed by +; for example *A+B*
NON expressed by small letter; for example, *a*
The logical relationship is expressed by *AB -> P*[7] in which *AB* is a cause of *P*.

Selected cases: conceptualization and justification
There are 12 cases selected, representing 16 African countries that are served by the UNPBF. The criteria for selecting these specific countries are: 1) They are all served by the UNPBF's Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) in the period 2006-2010, all benefitting from the same set of activities meant for countries in "emergency or shock (e.g. political violence) at any time, or transitional government, or unforeseen needs; or significant peacebuilding opportunity arises which triggers the SG to initiate a system-wide response"[8]. The study left out African states served by UNPBF's other mechanism, the Immediate Relief Fund[9]. Omission of other PRF states[10] is justified by the geographically determined context: I assume that a greater similarity between cases serves the purpose of the analysis. 2) They are all African fragile or failed states[11]. Therefore, the conceptual definition of the

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[7] In this example P signifies the outcome.
[8] Cited directly from UNPBF's website: < http://www.unpbf.org/how-we-fund/ > 2012, February 1
[9] This is motivated by the fact that the IRF mechanism supports a different set of goals in its implemented activities, thus making impossible the comparison between African PRF-supported and African IRF-supported states: Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia
[10] Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste
[11] The selected countries range between 2 (Chad) to 28 (Sierra Leone) in the 2011 Failed States   Index: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactiv e_map_and_rankings Accessed 3.02 2012> 2012, January 3. Kenya is a particular case, it is not considered a failed state, but in a situation of fragility, following brutal clashes in the pre-election period in 2007.

set of cases selected is: African failed or fragile states in postwar situation, following a civil war peace or transitional government, served by the UNPBF's PRF. These are: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

<u>Dependent variable</u>
The dependent variable is *relative stability given by the absence of renewed war, reported major killings or coups*. The indicator chosen is a composite measure, the Global Peace Index (GPI) which ranks 153 nations by their relative state of peace, using 23 indicators reflecting the incidence or absence of peace[12]. Out of the 23 indicators, the Level of Organised Conflict is a qualitative assessment of the intensity of the conflict/s within the country; the ranking is between 1 (very low) and 5 (very high). The threshold selected in 2.5: cases scoring between 1 and 2 receive a value of 1 (relative stability existing), whereas cases scoring between 2.5 and 5 receive a value of 0 for the outcome (relative stability absent). The outcome is coded by the letter *S* for the occurrence of the outcome and *s* for the absence of the outcome.

<u>Independent variables</u>
The justification for the choice of the particular independent variables and indicators for measurement derives from PRF's declared objectives to the set of countries chosen as cases[13]. Given the limited space available here, a selection has been made to select five variables for research. Each independent variable is described and quantified below (selected activities of PRF have been transformed into variables)[14]. In the data set, each will be represented by a capital letter, as follows:

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[12] More information about GPI is available at < http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2011/INCO> 2012, January 31
[13] I.e.: to establish security, build confidence in political processes, deliver economic incentives and peace dividends to jumpstart livelihoods and expand core national capacity

1. [14] The declared goals are: *Activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements, in particular in relation to national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;*
2. *Activities in support of efforts by the country to build and strengthen the capacities which promote coexistence and the peaceful resolution of conflict, thereby reducing the likelihood of recurrent conflict;*
3. *Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs;*

1.   **Security Systems Reform (SSR) (A)** – basic security is an essential need of the population in order to create the medium for political space and enable delivery of services, preferably by the state. The study will mark 1 in the cases where the presence of reported training programs for police and security forces and rebuilding of military infrastructure both result in the effects of increased security for citizens and orderly election management by the security forces.

2.   **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Socio-Economic Reintegration (B)** of ex-combatants form a single variable, due to the simple fact that these processes should occur in tandem. Its importance is crucial, often the first priority in a peace agreement. Successful DDR and Socio-Economic Reintegration processes reduce the engagement of former combatants and militias in unlawful activities (such as illegal natural resource exploitation), reduce the use of weapons as an income-generating tool and assists in the establishment of the rule of law, relapse into violent conflict and deters possible spoilers of peace. The study will mark 1 for more than 3,000 adults and 1,500 children per year as ex-combatants removed from hot spots, demobilized and who become beneficiaries of reintegration processes. A better indicator than total numbers would be percentage of combatants demobilized, i.e. if at least 75% or 90% etc have been DDR'ed; this requires however a more extensive research on estimated numbers of combatants and can be the subject of further investigation.

3.   Political dialogue (C) is an element of support for the implementation of the peace agreements. The mark 1 signals reported and mediated dialogue between opposing fractions or presidential candidates, sustained and funded for a period of more than 1 year; it includes regional inter-ethnic dialogue and resolutions on land disputes. It excluded however efforts of advocacy in support of political dialogue and consensus as well as media activities broadcasting messages in support of political dialogue, for the reason that the latter activities are 'not there just yet'.

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4.   *Critical interventions to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process (e.g., reintegration of ex-combatants disarmed under a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme)*
     (TOR PBF 2006, 4-5)

4.   **More efficient judiciary system (D).** The efficiency adjective refers to making the judiciary system accessible, a factor that goes a long way in addressing the root causes of war. The indicators for this variable are two-fold: i) reported training of legal professionals and consequently a clearance of backlogged cases by 50% implemented decisions, and ii) the presence of transitional justice systems and reported truth and reconciliation consultations. Value of 0 is given to cases that fall under the indicator, respectively 1 for those cases that comply with it.

5.   **National reconciliation mechanisms (E).** Whereas the variable C refers to inter-party dialogue, E targets increased responsibility behavior of political parties and a mechanism of accountability by dialogue and consultation frameworks between governmental and non-governmental actors engaged in fostering a democratic process. The indicator used in this respect is at least four reported dialogue processes between CSOs and government authorities per year. Compliance with the indicator will be noted by 1, non-compliance with 0.

The indicators are selected as being the best available to measure the incidence of each variable. There are issues of arbitrariness and bias in the variables chosen to measure *relative stability*; in order to obtain a comparable scale, they are agreed upon following closely the UNPBF's measures across the cases selected for analysis.

Analysis of data and results
The first stage of analysis will determine if any of the individual causal conditions is necessary or sufficient for the outcome to occur. Annex 1A features the necessity analysis for the presence of the outcome. The consistency scores of the conditions must be under the value of 0.9 to conclude that the causal conditions individually are necessary for the occurrence of the outcome; the consistency values of the conditions range between 0.25 to 0.75; the coverage for variables C (Political dialogue) and E (National Reconciliation Mechanisms) takes a value of 1 which means that whenever they each appear in a combination, the outcome will occur. Annex 1B presents the analysis of necessary conditions for the absence of the outcome; in this case, the consistency of two causal conditions registers values of 1, being necessary to explain the absence of the outcome. The absence of political dialogue (c) and national reconciliation (e) individually thus explain the absence of relative stability (s). Thus, the necessity analysis

already reveals an important finding of the research – the crucial importance of political dialogue and national reconciliation – and the rest of the analysis will develop it and further explain it.

The second step in the research is constructing the truth table (Annex 2) that tests all possible combinations of the variables[15]. The consistency column shows the score for each row; a consistency of 1 indicates the existence of the desired outcome, whereas 0 marks the absence. The rows displaying possible combinations without at least one empirical correspondent are analyzed through the use of simplifying assumptions, a procedure which will be carried out further in the research.

The truth table shows that the outcome occurs in six out of 12 cases, while in three cases it does not. There are three contradictions (marked C), meaning that in the respective row has both correspondents in which the outcome occurs and correspondents in which the outcome does not occur (DRC, Guinea and Uganda). The truth table contains 32 rows (two to the fifth power since there are five causal conditions). The rows without corresponding cases reflect the limited diversity and are not shown (row 10 to 22).

The next step in the analysis is the identification of the combinations of causal conditions explaining the outcome; the procedure is to analyze the combinations for which the outcome occurs – the outcome takes a value of 1, before and after simplifying assumptions.

The solution formula for the occurrence of the outcome without simplifying assumptions is the most complex solution explaining the occurrence of the outcome (S):

$$ACdE + abcD + bcDE + abcdE \rightarrow S \qquad (1)$$

The cases corresponding to each combination are as follows: Burundi + Comoros; Burundi + Cote d'Ivoire; Liberia + Sierra Leone; Kenya.

Burundi and Comoros follow the same pattern (ACdE); in their case, Security System Reform (SSR) measures, coupled with political dialogue

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[15] Based on the data set, the truth table contains the empirical correspondents (cases) from the data set, as well as combinations that do not appear in reality, thus providing a complete picture of the limited diversity.

and national reconciliation mechanisms enabled the occurrence of relative stability, in spite of a weak judicial system. Both Burundi and Comoros received an infusion of capital for training police personnel and undergo key institutional reforms in the security sector. Burundi's former rebel group, the FNL, stepped into the political arena as a political party in 2008, enabling a needed political dialogue in the country. Comoros contending presidential candidates sat down for negotiations in preparation for the 2010 election that marked the country's re-adoption of democratic measures.

Further relevant initial conclusions can be drawn in the case of Burundi along Cote d'Ivoire in the second causal combination (ABCd). In spite of two justice projects supported in Burundi by PBF on Decisions and Judgments and Local Tribunals (which contributed to the reduction of part of the backlog of cases in provinces most affected by the war and to local communities' access to justice), neither of these projects, however, addressed the structural or policy barriers to a more independent and effective judicial system. SSR in Cote d'Ivoire continued in a process of reform throughout the period 2004-2008 (much of it supported by UNOCI[16]); DDR and reintegration mechanisms resulted in 526 micro-projects for 3.500 beneficiaries, FAFN[17] ex-combatants. Political dialogue was strengthened in support of the implementation of the Ouagadougou Peace Process throughout 2007-2010 talks between Gbagbo and FN, the coalition of rebel forces.

The third causal combination positions Liberia and Sierra Leone along (bcDE). Both cases displayed visible outputs on a more efficient juridical system (D) and national reconciliation mechanisms (E), segments supported by UNPBF. The Fund considers the successful dialogue between ethnic groups in Nimba county, Liberia, an exportable model on reconciliation (the process took place in the period 2008-2009). The country's weak justice system was a key conflict factor; reported activities in this sector have addressed conflict drivers and shown important results on illicit mining, public knowledge on the rule of law and legal rights. Trials and arrested in suspected criminal acts were also carried out. In Sierra Leone, UNPBF sustained the recruitment and training of 39 legal professionals; trials and reparations for victims of sexual violence during

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[16] United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
[17] Data reported by PBSO, 2010. FAFN is the military branch of the Forces Nouvelles de Cote d'Ivoire, a coalition of rebel forces

the war contributed to solving backlogged justice cases. The analytic pattern for both cases shows a lesser weight on DDR and political dialogue.

Kenya's December 2007 elections sparked violence and tension in the capital but especially in the Rift Valley Province, where the unrest took ethnic dimensions; the events left behind 1,000 deaths and displaced around 248,215. In the following year, UNPBF mobilized one million USD towards community dialogue sessions and facilitation of inclusion; due to the nature of the conflict in the case of Kenya (ethnic clashes in the pre-election phase), the analysis reveals the causal condition (E), national reconciliation, as a determinant of the outcome. This aspect checks against Kenyan realities and alludes once again to the appropriate sensitivity of the method chosen to the context characterizing the cases selected for analysis.

The next step of the analysis strengthens the findings of the first stage. After the use of simplifying assumptions[18], the prime implicants[19] being the two necessary conditions identified in the necessity analysis; the parsimonious formula obtained is:

$$C + E \text{->} S \tag{2}$$

Thus, the prime implicants are *C* and *E*, covering the following cases: Burundi + Comoros+ Cote d'Ivoire + Liberia + Sierra Leone, and respectively Burundi + Comoros + Kenya + Liberia + Sierra Leone.

The last part of the analysis deals with the cases that do not display the outcome. The most complex solution formula is the following:

$$Acde + Abce \text{->} s \tag{3}$$

The first causal combination covers CAR and Chad and indicate the insufficiency of SSR measures; in CAR, UNPBF mobilized five million USD towards the reconstruction of military infrastructure for the national gendarmerie to complement other security sector reform programs. In Chad, the support for Détachement Inregré de la Securité (DIS) was essential in stabilizing Eastern Chad. The SSR (A) in combination with

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[18] This operation is done through giving score of 0 and 1 for the rows without empirical correspondents and performing minimization.

[19] The prime implicants are reduced combinations of conditions that imply subsets of combinations.

three other causal conditions (c, d and e) leads to the absence of the outcome in both cases analyzed, due to marginal progress in political dialogue and area of justice. The Central African Republic's 2007 higher level dialogue in support of multi-party stakeholder political engagement aiming at creating a road map for implementation of peace agreement did not include all combatant parties. National reconciliation mechanisms in the same country were marginal as well, with a focus on the potential of media as a dissemination channel for reconciliation dialogue.

The second combination covers Chad and Guinea Bissau; in the latter, the same effort to rebuild military infrastructure (A) combined with delays in implementation of disarming and integrating youth combatants (b), political dialogue (d) and national reconciliation mechanisms jeopardized relative stability (s). Guineea Bissau registered extreme political violence in the period 2009-2010 with the assassination of the President and Chief of General Staff, followed by unlawful military actions in April 2010, by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces.

After the inclusion of simplifying assumptions, the most parsimonious solution formula explaining the cases that do not display the outcome is:

$$Ac \rightarrow s \qquad (4)$$

The cases covered are the same as in the analysis without simplifying assumptions: CAR, Chad and Guinea Bissau, alluding to the failure to produce the outcome when peering up SSR (A) with the absence of political dialogue (c).

Whereas causal conditions c and e both appeared necessary to explain the absence of the outcome, after the inclusion of simplifying assumptions, the absence of political dialogue (c) in combination with the presence of SSR (A) explains the absence of relative stability. The causal condition A is a constant, appearing in combinations in the absence of other conditions c, d and e with no simplifying assumptions, to explain the absence of the outcome, whereas the most parsimonious solution excluded the absence of national reconciliation (e) as a determinant factor for the absence of the outcome.

Conclusion

Peacebuilding is a fundamentally experimental field, requiring regular monitoring and external evaluations to inform advancement and promote lessons learned. The parameters in which peacebuilding measures are implemented are highly contextual and country-specific. These observations characterize the complex environment in which the UNPBF has operated (PBFR, 2009:14).

The UNPBF initiatives are meant to have a strong impact on the national peacebuilding efforts of the targeted countries, in the context of a gap in the early stages of postwar recovery and peacebuilding, immediately following the conclusion of a peace agreement, when action to sustain an official cease fire is vital and resources from other mechanisms may not yet be available.

This research provides important findings that relate political dialogue and national reconciliation processes to the relative stability. Furthermore, the presence of SSR in the absence of political dialogue, of a more efficient judiciary system and of national reconciliation mechanisms is associated with the absence of the outcome.

The value of the present research is intrinsic in these findings and could be a starting point in the elaboration of peacebuilding strategies for African fragile states; given the geographical limitation imposed in the selection of cases, it is hard to determine based on this research to what extent these conclusions would be applicable to other regions. This research should be regarded as a starting point for further research, including other conflict-torn countries, in different regions of the world.

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Appendix

ANNEX 1: **Analysis of Necessary Conditions**	
Outcome variable: s	Outcome variable: ~s
Conditions tested, consistency and coverage	Conditions tested, consistency and coverage
a, 0.500000, 0.571429	a, 0.750000, 0.428571
~a, 0.500000, 0.800000	~a, 0.250000, 0.200000

b, 0.500000, 0.666667	b, 0.500000, 0.333333
~b, 0.500000, 0.666667	~b, 0.500000, 0.333333
c, 0.625000, 1.000000	c, 0.000000, 0.000000
~c, 0.375000, 0.428571	~c, 1.000000, 0.571429
d, 0.250000, 0.666667	d, 0.250000, 0.333333
~d, 0.750000, 0.666667	~d, 0.750000, 0.333333
e, 0.625000, 1.000000	e, 0.000000, 0.000000
~e, 0.375000, 0.428571	~e, 1.000000, 0.571422

ANNEX 2: Truth Table, Five Conditions, Relative Stability and Corresponding Cases

Row	A	B	C	D	E	S	Corresponding cases
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	Burundi
2	1	1	0	0	0	0	Central African Republic (CAR) Chad
3	1	0	1	0	1	1	Comoros
4	0	1	0	0	0	C	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Uganda
5	1	1	1	0	0	1	Cote d'Ivoire
6	1	0	0	1	0	0	Guinea Bissau
7	0	0	0	0	1	1	Kenya
8	1	0	1	1	1	1	Liberia
9	0	0	1	1	1	1	Sierra Leone
10... 22	0	0	0	0	0	?	-

ANNEX 3: Simplifying assumptions for outcome S

A{0}B{0}C{0}D{1}E{1}   +
A{0}B{0}C{1}D{0}E{0}   +
A{0}B{0}C{1}D{0}E{1}   +
A{0}B{0}C{1}D{1}E{0}   +
A{0}B{1}C{0}D{0}E{1}   +
A{0}B{1}C{0}D{1}E{1}   +

A{0}B{1}C{1}D{0}E{0}   +
A{0}B{1}C{1}D{0}E{1}   +
A{0}B{1}C{1}D{1}E{0}   +
A{0}B{1}C{1}D{1}E{1}   +
A{1}B{0}C{0}D{0}E{1}   +
A{1}B{0}C{0}D{1}E{1}   +
A{1}B{0}C{1}D{0}E{0}   +
A{1}B{0}C{1}D{1}E{0}   +
A{1}B{1}C{0}D{0}E{1}   +
A{1}B{1}C{0}D{1}E{1}   +
A{1}B{1}C{1}D{1}E{0}   +
A{1}B{1}C{1}D{1}E{1} -> S

Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 18
(Please note that in Tosmana notation A{0} means a and A{1} means A)

ANNEX 4: Simplifying assumptions for outcome s
A{1}B{0}C{0}D{0}E{1}   +
A{1}B{0}C{0}D{1}E{1}   +
A{1}B{1}C{0}D{0}E{1}   +
A{1}B{1}C{0}D{1}E{0}   +
A{1}B{1}C{0}D{1}E{1}
Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 5