

## CIVIC ENGAGEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS AND THE BENEFICIAL POTENTIAL OF RELIGION

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### Abstract

Since the publishing of Robert Putnam's „Bowling Alone“, the relation between religious engagement and the production of social capital is on the agenda of scholars of religious studies and sociology. He argued that religiously engaged people are essential for democracy as they fulfill the need for civil participation by generating social capital to a greater extent than non-religious people. This approach will be combined with the “Civic Voluntarism Model” by Verba, Brady and Schlozman to outline the potential of religious groups to enable their members to be civic participants. These theoretical concepts are applied to the context of integration of Muslim immigrants. Here, the paper focuses on the situation of second generation Muslim immigrants in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. These countries have in common, that a large part of the Muslim immigration was caused by the call for immigrant workers and therefore, similar patterns can be observed. All over central and western Europe, Muslim immigration is a highly controversial topic in political debates. By taking a look at historical aspects, the actual situation and possible needs of a religious minority suffering from discrimination and politicisation, potentials for improvement can be shown.

**Keywords:** Social capital, civil society, civic engagement, social integration, Muslim minorities, second generation immigrants, Islam in Europe;

### Introduction

Europe and the Islamic world have a long common history of trade and mutual learning as well as territorial wars and religious conflicts. Today's relations between the European nations, respectively the European Union, and the Islamic world, respectively Islam as a religion, is as diverse as the historical points of contact were.

Timothy M Savage speaks of a “twofold Islamic Challenge” for Europe: Externally, Europe has to deal with its security policies with its neighbouring States, which are, “from Casablanca to Caucasus”, primarily Muslim populated. Internally European states are challenged by the integration of growing Muslim minorities. (Savage 2010, 2)

In most contemporary European societies, immigration in general has become one of the most highly discussed political topics (Heine, Lohlker and Potz 2012; Baumann and Stolz 2007; Bade and Hiesserich 2009 ;).

Amongst other factors, the 9/11 terrorist attacks tightened that focus on Muslim immigrants. Beside all populist campaigns and islamophobic tendencies (Bunzl and Hafez 2009; Schneiders 2010; Mattes 2011) it is necessary to deal with questions about the integration of Muslim immigrants on a professional level. The Immigrants who came from the 1950ies onwards, to countries like Austria and Germany mostly as “guest workers”, to Great Britain and France especially due to their colonial history, have settled down. New generations of young Muslims are growing up as part of a religious minority in those countries.

This article focuses on the relation between religions, in particular Islam, and integration. By taking a look at the mechanisms of integration and the role of religion in that process, chances and limitations of religion as an integrative factor will be outlined. Especially the situation of young Muslims, who are second generation immigrants, will be focused on.

Although ethnic backgrounds come into play, the Muslim minority is characterized by religion. The political discussion, as well as the media discourse focus on these minorities as Muslims and not as Turks, Bosniacs, Pakistanis, Chechens etc. (Casanova 2006). Connections to the parents' countries of origin tend to become looser among second generation immigrants (Stepick 2011; Ormig 2006). To some extent this is also the case with religious affiliation. (Religionsmonitor 2008)

Still European states have to accept that Islam has settled in. Those who decide to live a religious live and raise their children in that respect, will define themselves as Muslims in future generations as well. It is questionable if this will be the case for the ethnic sense of belonging.

This paper will examine the issue of the integration of minorities like those mentioned above. The term integration in general has to be used with the utmost care, as it is easily misunderstood as a request for assimilation. In this article, integration refers to the creation of equal opportunities for this new generation of European Muslims within the wider society (Pieneing, 2005). This includes personal efforts as well as societal changes towards tolerance, the offer to participate as well as the will to do so.

Participation is a key word for this article, as it will be shown that for today's young Muslims, integration doesn't refer to language skills or a general understanding of local culture. Integration refers to active

participation, in the sense of being an equal part, in the society they grow up. Therefore the concept of social capital will be used to analyse the integrative potential of religion in terms of civic participation.

At the beginning of this article it is necessary to name some practical limitations for this paper. Due to the Author's research background, the central focus of this article will be the German speaking area, bearing in mind the broader European context. Furthermore this paper describes theoretical concepts of participation and refers to concrete surveys as well as ongoing research projects. Some aspects of the complex links between migration, integration and religion will be analysed with the concepts of social capital and civil voluntarism. To do so, it is useful to start with a brief overview of Muslim immigration, its history and consequences within the respective countries.

### **1.1. Muslim Migration to Europe - A brief overview**

Not only have various electoral campaigns all over Europe of the past years shown that immigration is one of the main topics on contemporary Europe's political agenda. Immigration policies have also decided elections and provide space for populist campaigns on nationalist values and unwelcome foreignness (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002). At the latest since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, immigration discourse has narrowed to a debate on Muslim immigration and integration (Amaro 2011, 148).

From the 1950ies onwards, Europe has been a continent of immigration but not even a century ago great waves of European emigration, especially to the United States, changed demographics (Bade 2005). Decolonisation, reaching its height in the 1950ies and the European economic growth of the 1960ies changed the directions of migratory movement (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2007). The war-torn European continent got back on its feet and was in need of workers. This is especially true for Austria and Germany, countries that had lost a war and were recovering more quickly than expected (“Wirtschaftswunder”) (Fassmann and Münz 1995, 211 ff.). Although the result of this wave of work migration (“Gastarbeiterbewegung”) was only one of many migration movements within these countries' histories, it influenced the religious landscape strongly (Nökel 2002; Hunn 2005).

Sasse and Thielemann describe the taxonomy of migration as threefold: economic, forced and family migration (Sasse and Thielemann: 2005: 657). Muslim migration to Europe covers all of them. Muslim guest workers and

people from former colonies came for mainly economic reasons and partly looking for better life perspectives. Such work migrants were predominantly young males and those who decided to stay often organised their families' immigration. The case of forced migration is true for rather recent migration movements, here especially from the Balkans during the war in Yugoslavia, but also from other countries with precarious political situations in the near east and northern Africa.

Due to Turkish and former Yugoslavian work migrants, Muslims, for the first time, became a noticeable share of population in Switzerland and Germany and the Republic of Austria. In Austria Islam has a long history due to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Today's legal situation reflects that, as the Islam Law ("Islamgesetz") from 1912 is still valid and recognises Islam as an acknowledged religion in Austria (Heine, Lohlker and Potz 2012, 49 ff.).

Except for this small period during the turn of 19th to 20th century, the number of Muslims remained negligible until the beginning of the 1960ies, when the call for workers brought eastern European and Turkish Muslims to Austria. (Marik-Lebeck, 2010)

With Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the number of Muslims in Austria, Germany and Switzerland increased again in the 1990ies. Also, the so called guest workers had settled by that time and their families had joined.

In 2000 around 3,7% of the German population (around 3 Million) were Muslims. Muslims accounted 4,3% of the Swiss (around 311 000) and Austrian populations (around 345 000). In 2009 the percentage of Muslims was 5.2% in Germany, and 6.2% in Austria. In 2010, estimates for Switzerland suggest the percentage of Muslims to be around 5.7%. These numbers show, that over the past five to six decades, Islam has become a significant factor in the religious landscape. (Statista 2012; Statistik Austria 2010; Bovay 2004; Pew Research Center 2012)

Although the political and media discourse focuses on Muslim immigrants when integration policies are discussed, immigrants from Islamic countries are not always the largest group of immigrants.

In Germany, Turkey is in fact the main country of origin among immigrants, followed by Italy and Poland (Statista 2011). Italians are the biggest group of Immigrants in Switzerland, followed by people from former Yugoslavia, Germans and Turks (Bundesamt für Statistik 2006). In Austria the biggest groups of immigrants are Germans, followed by migrants from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. The two mainly Muslim

countries Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina rank third and fourth in the list of countries of origin (Janda and Vogl 2010). The biggest religious group among Austrian immigrants are orthodox Christians. Still, Muslims seem to be the most visible and most highly discussed religious group.

### **1.2. Islam as Immigrant religion – Islam becoming European**

To talk about Islam in Europe requires a great deal of generalisation. So far the borders of Europe haven't been defined. The differences concerning religious affiliation, migration history and colonial history between the EU-countries only could not be bigger. The origins of Muslims, and therefore the way Islam is lived, vary from country to country. Keeping in mind, that a Muslim in Great Britain, whose grandparents originated from Pakistan, a Turkish girl studying in Bavaria, a refugee from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris and a Bosnian Muslim in Vienna won't have much in common, certain trends can be identified.

Islam has become the second biggest religion in Europe. This development is mainly due to the migration movements described above, starting with refugees after World War II and migration flows as a result of decolonisation, followed by the arrival of "guest workers" and, until today, economic migration and refugees from all over the world.

From the second half of the twentieth century on, migration to Western Europe was mainly Islamic. Not only in fact but also in people's minds, as Casanova argues, Islamic culture and religion is far more visible than many other religions, especially more than Christian migrants. Therefore various dimensions of "otherness" overlap, as "the immigrant", "the Turk", "the poor", "the Muslim" and "the other" become one and the same in the perception of the majority of society (Casanova 2006: 185).

Muslims in Europe are far away from speaking with a single voice against such perceptions. The countries of origin, and quite often also political attitudes of these countries, characterise the different Muslim communities within the European countries. In the German speaking area Muslims are mainly organised in associations (Deutsche Islamkonferenz 2008). These groups are often ethnically bound and derive from mosque communities. Such organisations developed early as the first Muslim migrants were in need of places of worship (Lemmen 2002).

Umbrella organisations were established later, often with support from Islamic countries. A prominent example for such an organisation is DITIB (respectively ATIB in Austria) which is directly funded by a governmental institution of Turkey, the office for religious affairs "diyanet". Many other

associations have ties to organisations within Islamic countries as well and organise the recruitment of imams for Austria and Germany (Lemmen 2002; Heine, Lohlker and Potz 2012). This practice has often been criticised, as it prevents the development of a European Islam. Also the lacking language skills of such “imported” imams were held against these associations (Malik 2011).

Only recently, Islamic theology was established as a course of study at the University of Tübingen. In 2012, three other German Universities are planning to introduce similar curricula. In Austria a similar study program is planned (Aslan 2012). Academic education for Teachers of Islamic religious education already exists. In Switzerland, the National Research Project NFP 58 deals with the possibility of creating a course of studies for Islamic theology. (Schweizerischer Nationalfonds 2010)

This advancement partly follows the debates on the development of a European Islam. Bassam Tibi's call for a “Euro-Islam” has made the idea of a European version of Islam popular in public discourse. Still, Tibi's vision of this new manifestation of religion is often rejected by European Muslims (Halm 2010, 304). On the other hand, Islamic Theologians, like Tariq Ramadan, intensively reflect on Islamic life in the West and are very popular among European Muslims (e.g. Ramadan 2004).

These open questions on the further development of Islam in Europe respectively the German speaking countries, which are followed by politics and media, concern not only the theological but also the organisational side.

Among the second generation of Muslim immigrants, there are certain tendencies to overcome the ethnic/confessional division (Ornig 2006), which can be found in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Trans-ethnic groups who view their foreign roots as part of their identity but define themselves as Muslim and European could give an outlook, how Islam in Europe might develop.

### **1.3. Integration and Second Generations**

In migration research, the differentiation between the individual generations of immigrants is central. The second generation of Muslim immigrants has already been mentioned. But “who” is the second generation? The term generation mostly refers to people who were born and live at the same time or a period of time, generally considered to be between 25 and 30 years in which children grow up and start to have children on their own. Other meanings of generation are a stage in descent

and a group of people of the same age who are involved in particular activities. (New Oxford English Dictionary 2012)

In terms of migration research the most important characteristic of the second generation is the place of birth, respectively the place of growing up. First generation immigrants usually refers to people who decided as adults to migrate or were at least older than 14 when they left their country of origin. Children of immigrants, who were born in the country their parents moved to, arrived before elementary school age or slightly after can be considered as second generation. Children who migrate after the age of ten are often considered as "generation 1.5". Citizenship, identification with the parents' home country, language skills or other factors do not play a role in this designation. (Ornig 2006: 20 f.)

Therefore we cannot speak about a second generation of immigrants as a homogeneous group. On the contrary, the second generation of Muslim immigrants is very diverse in terms of age, religious affiliation and foreign roots. Still, surveys show certain commonalities among second generation immigrants in general. Whereas first generation immigrants are often very much oriented to their home country, their children are less likely to consider their parents' country of origin as their "homeland". Significant changes between parents' and children's views, attitudes and lifestyles also affect religion:

"In the context of religion, this often provokes tension, specifically over the appropriate language for religious services and particular moral codes, usually concerning respect for authority and gender roles" (Stepick 2009: 8)

Nikola Ornig's survey on second generation Muslims in Austria (Ornig 2006) shows this process in detail. Most of the interviewees report about tensions concerning "appropriate" behaviour, clothes, friends, etc. Most interviewees report on a kind of individual search for a religious identity as well as a way to express it. This process is complicated by ascriptions and expectations from majority society, as well as family and social surroundings. Religious communities can be viewed as an important place for such processes:

"[...] Researchers view immigrant religious communities as places where the second generation is present, negotiates their relationship with the first generation, and gathers cultural and social capital that leads to economic and educational success" (Bankston & Zhou 1995, 1996)

Beside intergenerational conflicts and the negotiation of cultural belonging, many young people feel a need for integration, in the sense of "feeling

comfortable in their social environment”, as all interviewees in Ornig research describe a feeling of “otherness”. On the other hand they express the wish for acknowledgement (Ornig 2006: 373). Ornig views this wish as the central characteristic of the second generation. Integration for the second generation therefore refers to a feeling of acceptance, the end of discrimination and as mentioned before, the creation of equal chances.

Such social inequality is closely connected to the availability of different forms of capital. Especially the access to social capital is decisive for social integration. Therefore the concept of social capital, its mechanisms and potentials will be introduced in the following.

### **2.1. The concept of social capital**

To understand the meaning of social capital it is necessary to take a look at the origins of this term. Although the first appearance of social capital dates back to the 1920ies, where Lyda Judson Hanifan discussed rural school community centres (Hanifan 1916, 1920), it was only in the 1980ies when the term became used more frequently by a great range of scholars. Especially Pierre Bourdieu's and James Coleman's works are viewed as decisive for today's understanding of social capital: Bourdieu differentiated between economic, cultural, social (and sometimes symbolical) capital as he disagreed with scholars like Marx who saw a dictate of a one dimensional form of capital, namely economic capital. Bourdieu still viewed cultural, social and symbolic capital as expressions of economic capital, but he was very aware of the more dimensional forms of capital exchange that take place in societies.

“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”(Bourdieu 1983, 249).

Bourdieu interpreted every societal action as a fight for capital. In his view, a continuous fight for social status is normality and social capital is the object to achieve in that struggle. Social capital in Bourdieu's writings is far away from an independent concept. It is closely tied to the other forms of capital and only an additional category he introduced for the better understanding of social mobility and the general functioning of society.

James Coleman, who introduces the concept of social capital as a “third way” in the sociological conception of individuals as either governed by socialisation or individual rationality, detaches the concept from the close connection to economic capital Bourdieu views and emphasises its non-

economic value (Coleman 1988). Coleman's definition of social capital is rather vague: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure" (Coleman 1994, 302).

Coleman uses a variety of examples to show the multiple, layered functions of social capital. From the simplest forms of community structure, where A did B a favour once and can now rely on B's support whenever needed, to the modes of information exchange among high level politicians, social capital is the "currency" of these "transactions". But Coleman examines that social capital outranges such non-economic or immaterial deals. In a community with a high level of social capital, certain norms become part of this concept. The ideal of individuals acting for "the common good", putting community interests before their own ones, is a good example for such norms which can be viewed as part of and/or outcome of the existence of social capital.

When Robert Putnam wrote his books "Making democracy work" (1993) and "Bowling alone" (2000, based on an article from 1995) he brought social capital to the „front stage of social science“(Huysseune 2003, 211). In his first book Putnam shows the connection between social trusts (and in succession social capital) and the functioning of a democracy. In his second book Putnam then examines social capital in the USA and concludes pessimistically: Social connections erode, Americans are "bowling alone". In his writings social capital becomes more and more an independent and also normative concept.

"By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital--tools and training that enhance individual productivity--'social capital' refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit." (Putnam 1995, 2)

Putnam describes social capital as the main factor for a well-functioning community life. Whereas Bourdieu and Coleman located social capital and its effects on the individual level, Putnam emphasises social capital as a factor within communities, directly influencing civic life.

"For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage

the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we" [...]." (Putnam 1995, 2f.)

The concept of social capital became popular in economic debates as well, where it is valued as an important factor on the level of institutional cooperation: "Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions... Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society - it is the glue that holds them together" (The World Bank 1999).

## **2.2. Social Capital and Social Integration**

Social capital is closely connected to integration in general, as contacts with members of the receiving society are commonly viewed as an indicator for social integration (Haug and Pointner 2007, 385).

Berry suggests four strategies of acculturation of immigrants:

- 1) Integration: Integration is characterised by a high level of social capital (not limited to the ethnic community) and a high level of cultural capital (in Bourdieu's understanding).
- 2) Assimilation: Assimilation refers to the situation where a person or a group possesses a high cultural capital and no social capital among the ethnic community.
- 3) Segregation: Segregation means a lot of social capital, limited to the ethnic community and no cultural capital.
- 4) Marginalisation: Marginalisation refers to a lack of any social as well as cultural capital.

(Berry 1990, Haug and Pointner 2007, 384)

A differentiation between social capital, based on inner-ethnic relations and social capital that refers to wider networks is made, as the effects of each type of social capital differ substantially. Such differentiations will be further explained within this paper.

Between the first and second generation of immigrants, there are significant changes concerning the social relations of parents and children. A survey by Nauck and Suckow shows for example, that the social network of second generation immigrants enlarges and the share of relatives within this social network decreases in comparison to their parents' social ties. (Nauck and Suckow 2002). In 1990, Esser and Friedrichs showed that, regarding ethnical backgrounds, the parental networks are rather homogeneous, whereas the next generation's social contacts become more multicultural, respectively have more contacts to, in that case, Germans. (Esser and Friedrichs 1990)

This expectable development might be slowed down by especially strong links within ethnic communities. Therefore the question of "outer" links is especially important, as is, for this paper, the question if religious engagement promotes such links.

### **2.3. Social Capital and Religion**

So far no connection between religion and social capital has been mentioned, as the historical development of the concept of social capital was explained. Social scientists only recently began to study relations between social capital and religion. The publication of Putnam's "Bowling alone" could be viewed as a starting point, as he discovered an interesting connection between religious engagement and the generation of social capital:

What he found out was that religiously engaged people generate, more often than non-religious people, a great amount of social capital and showed much more civic participation than non-religious people did. He calls faith communities therefore "the single most important repository of social capital in America" (Putnam 2000, 66).

"Churches provide an important incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community interest and civic recruitment. Religiously active Men and Women learn to give speeches, run meetings, manage disagreements, and bear administrative responsibility. They also befriend others who are in turn likely to recruit them into other forms of community activity. In part for these reasons churchgoers are more likely to be involved in secular organizations, to vote and participate politically in other ways and to have deeper informal social connections." (Putnam 2000, 66)

Putnam's description already sketches the reason for the relevance of social capital for the integration of immigrants: Social capital is closely connected to civic participation. Civic participation, for this article, is understood in a

broad sense. Sometimes, political scientists limit civic engagement to voter participation. Here, civic participation is understood as a wide range of activities that reach out from a religious group into wider society and will be further explained later on.

It should be emphasized, that many scholars view religion as an important factor for community functions in general. Arguing with Putnam, one could see religious engagement as a catalyst for the development of social capital. Ecklund phrases it more explicitly: "Religion also has the ability to provide a moral narrative for helping others outside an individual's own religious or ethnic communities" (Cadge and Ecklund 2007, 367).

#### **2.4. Social Capital – a panacea?**

Since Bourdieu and Coleman wrote about social capital, the concept has been applied to innumerable contexts. It was detached from the original, individual level and used to evaluate the economic/social/governmental performances of groups, cities and even whole nations. As Portes argues, social capital has become synonymous for community itself (Portes 2000). A scientific concept that is charged with values is always in danger of turning a blind eye on undesirable effects.

"At the individual level, the processes alluded to by the concept cut both ways. Social ties can bring about greater control over wayward behaviour and provide privileged access to resources. They can also restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access to the same resources through particularistic preferences." (Portes 1998, 23)

Therefore the concept has to be applied with care. Although social capital seems promising to explain certain mechanisms in society, the normative way in which some scholars use social capital ignores possible negative outcomes connected with the creation of social relations.

Even Robert Putnam sees this negative potential and refers to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, when he argues:

"What I wish to emphasize is that all forms of social capital, indeed any form of capital, can be used to ends that are in some instances destructive." (Putnam 2001, 3)

This must also be true for the social relations of second generation immigrants. Bearing that in mind, the look at the integrative potential of religious groups must be twofold as well and allow outcomes in both directions. In the following, this paper will examine the idea of civil society and ask about mechanisms of engagement within that sphere.

### **3.1. Civil society and Civic engagement**

Civil society is not a clearly defined concept. So called spatial definitions are common to understand the basic framework of civil society. Thiery names civil society a sphere of collective action and public discourse between private life and the state (Thiery 2005, 1175). Historically the term was used amongst others by Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Weber, Marx, Gramsci and Habermas in very diverse contexts. Adloff describes the meaning of civil society as a threefold: a societal sphere of organisations and institutions, civil manners and a utopian project (Adloff, 2005, 8). Social Capital as a key to participation in civil society refers to all three of these aspects. Organisations and institutions provide space for individuals to participate. These individuals participate according to certain rules which are created within that space and ideally, create a better society through their actions.

Schmitter and Karl argue, that civil society refers to “Diverse units of social identity and interest... independent of the state. Civil Society in their opinion can not only restrain the arbitrary actions of rulers, but can also contribute to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of others, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in their willingness to sacrifice for the common good. At its best, civil society provides an intermediate layer of governance between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and controlling the behaviour of members without public coercion... A viable civil society can therefore mitigate conflicts...” (Karl and Schmitter 1991)

Civic participation refers to active engagement within that sphere and comprises a wide variety of possibilities. Membership in various associations, all kinds of charity work on the individual level and in groups and all kinds of public initiatives are considered to be civic participation.

Civic participation always goes beyond the private sphere and is never limited to interaction with friends and family. Civic participation also includes political engagement which makes the difference to the more closed term of social participation (Roßteutscher 2009).

### **3.2. Civic participation and social integration**

Civic engagement is considered to have three strains of positive outcome (Schlozman, Verba, Brady 199, 427).

1. It educates individuals.
2. It strengthens communities.

3. It secures the equal protection of interests, of different groups, in public life.

It is especially this third aspect that is important for immigrants in general and especially in the second and third generation of Muslims in Europe. For a vital democracy it is not only important how many people participate in civil society and to what extent they do so, but also who they are:

“In short, concern for democratic equality forces us not only to inquire how many people are bowling and whether they do so solo or in leagues, but also to ask who bowls.” (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1999, 429).

Disadvantaged groups are normally less active in civic participation. The central European Muslim minorities can be considered as disadvantaged. When we look at the different forms of capital according to Bourdieu, it becomes clear that immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular have limited access to capital in its different forms: Concerning economic capital, surveys show, that the subjective risk of poverty rate is much higher among Muslim immigrants compared to the general population (Tausch, 2007).

The main way to gather cultural capital is through transmission within families (Bourdieu, 1983, 185). The socialization within other cultural areas seems to display a clear disadvantage. Symbolic capital is limited due to a negative discourse on Islam (Friesl et. Al, 2009). Social capital refers to relationships and structures within a community that promote cooperation for mutual benefit. Immigrants have to build up such connections from a very low level as they are newcomers to the host society.

To enable disadvantaged minority groups to participate, therefore can be a key to build up social capital, to allow the groups to speak with a “clear and loud voice” (Schlozman, Verba Brady 1999, 428) and to stand up for their needs and interests. Religious groups may provide the necessary conditions for participation and therefore have the potential to promote social integration.

### **3.3. Civic Engagement within religious communities**

Verba et al. argue in their „civic voluntarism model „that people don't participate „because they can't; because they don't want to; because nobody asked; “(Verba et al. 1995). Within the social movement theory, Kenneth D. Wald phrases this argument the other way around and uses the trinity of criminology: motive, means and opportunity, to express the needs of a person to be able to participate in civil society. He points out the

importance of understanding the mechanisms of civic engagement, especially when analysing religious groups.

„Like homicide detectives, scholars of religion and politics need to understand motive, means, and opportunity: the motives that draw religious groups into political action, the means that enable the religious to participate effectively, and the opportunities that facilitate their entry into the political system. “ (Wald et al. 1995, 124)

“Because they don't want to” - the lack of motives - might be one of the main reasons for people not participating in civil society. Putnam explains this reluctance by societal changes – namely pluralisation, individualisation and medialization that result in people losing their interest in community life. Religiously engaged people tend to find motives despite those trends, he argues. As religion is a strong source of values, this is not too much of a surprise. Religion holds the potential to influence a believer's behaviour in a variety of ways. Some scholars developed a specific category for the profit from religious engagement, religious capital, following the concept of social capital.

„Religious capital (and the spiritual capital that energises it) is [...]a resource that individuals and faith groups can access for their own personal well-being, but also ‘donate’ as a gift to the wider community. It overlaps with ideas of social capital, but it is also distinctive in some important respects [...] It also refers to the holistic vision for change held within an individual person's set of beliefs. “(Baker and Skinner 2006, 11f)

It is this “view for change” that has the potential to motivate people to participate in civil society, to “make them want to”. Concerning the means to participate, so called “civic skills” are needed. This term refers to the specific knowledge and abilities that allow individuals and groups to, for example, articulate their interests, carry out arguments, write letters, and lead discussions.

“‘Civic skills’ are the knowledge, abilities and attitudes that people need to be able to take an active role in society and to be “engaged citizens”. (European Commission 2011)

Religious organisations are viewed as especially suitable for the transmission of civic skills by many authors (e.g. Roßteutscher 2006, 38). Religious groups have a broad member spectrum, often including people with low socio-economic status, who otherwise wouldn't have access to this form of informal education. With civic skills people “can participate” and have the means to advocate for their causes.

According to the civic voluntarism model the third reason why people do not participate is the lack of opportunities - "because nobody asked". Religious groups do not necessarily provide such opportunities to their members. Whether they do so, is depending on the kind of social capital generated by the group.

A differentiation between three types of social capital is common:

- Bonding social capital refers to relations within a group of individuals that share certain characteristics. This type of social capital creates trust and solidarity within a rather homogeneous group and allows the members to rely on their co-members and find emotional support within their group. Obviously bonding social capital is the basis for cohesiveness as it creates a sense of belonging. Still, bonding social capital is not very "civic" as it only exists through and among homogeneous groups and their members.

- Bridging social capital refers to ties between individuals and groups that are different, for example in terms of their social characteristics. It is to be assumed that such connections are made to reach goals which cannot be reached through bonding social capital only.

"Scholars have argued, that bridging is especially important because it promotes a sense of civic responsibility, overcomes divisiveness and insularity, and encourages not only tolerance but cooperation that may be useful for addressing large-scale social problems [...]." (Wuthnow, 2002, 670)

- Linking social capital refers to links between people of different social, economic or socio-economic status. Linking social capital allows to build up relations to more powerful or influential people or groups and gain power, influence, prestige or other benefits from this relation.

Bonding social capital is definitely of great importance to any kind of group, even though it doesn't provide opportunities for civic participation. Such opportunities arise from bridging and linking social capital, as only these aspects of social capital connect to wider society. A group or network with a high level of bridging and linking social capital will "ask" their members for participation and therefore provide opportunities.

To be able to name these aspects of social capital, which allow and promote civic engagement, more precisely, Stepick et al. introduced the term "civic social capital" (CSC).

“CSC is a subset of bridging social capital that specifically links, in our case members of a specific congregation, to the broader civil society in which they are embedded.” (Stepick, Mahler and Rey, 16)

Stepick's category of civic social capital makes it easier to name those processes of capital generation, exchange and holding, that are relevant for civic engagement.

Here the question arises, whether the individual or the group should be the relevant unit for the analysis of social capital. For Robert Putnam, groups, associations, networks and communities are the condition for the generation of social capital.

“In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue”. The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital” (Putnam 2000, 19)

Although social capital in any form is defined through group interaction it might not be useful to view the community as the “generator” of social capital. Stepick argues that congregations, religious associations, churches or places of worship are “the potential site” where social capital can be created and promoted by individuals (Stepick, Mahler and Rey 2009). In the end it, is the individual, who works for, promotes and benefits from social interaction and its potential outcome.

## **Conclusion**

Within this paper, a variety of concepts, from different forms of capital, to the complex sphere of civic society, have been addressed. Links between these concepts have been established to show that religious engagement has the potential to raise civic engagement of group members. It can also be a potential promoter of social integration.

Bearing a potential is obviously far away from any form of automatic mechanism. It would be wrong to argue, that religious engagement in and of itself promotes social integration. Still, it seems promising, that religious groups are especially suited to provide for their members, in accordance with common theories like the civic voluntarism model, the necessary conditions for active engagement in civil society. Social capital is the generator of opportunities of such forms of engagement.

Looking at religious associations as carriers of such potential is especially important for the situation of second generation Muslim immigrants. This group has little access to such opportunities. With religious groups possibly

providing them, opportunities for integration of these young people as Muslims within Europe open up. Therefore it has to be an urgent interest of the scientific community to analyse and understand this potential.

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