

## KHOMEINISM AS HISTORICAL DASEIN

### The Sacralization of Politics and the Politization of the Sacred

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#### **Abstract:**

Modernity brought with itself an unprecedented technological progress which had a profound impact on society facilitating the rise of standards in material prosperity. The technological achievements linked the World in a communicational net that provided human beings all over the Globe with access to education and innovation. But all this came with a price and a temptation – because the hyper technologization of the world provided the tools for the “Political” to control and manage every aspect of human life. What started as a project of “Entzauberung” of the World was continued as a process of emptying the World of its transcendental, mystical dimension. By this, the World has been transformed it into an object that can be managed and modified according to man’s will and desire. This new managerial “Weltanschauung” which appeared in history as a western, European phenomenon, had the capacity to entangle the whole Globe creating a universal framework that would connect and influence even the most remote parts of the World. This autoreferential anthropocentric vision of the World created a circular articulation of legitimacy, a will to power base on will, a will to will. By this, the new world is enclosed in a mechanic reality that entraps everything in itself. As a response to this gigantic phenomenon, pockets of dissident epistemologies tried to maintain their self as a way to “differ”. In our case, the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini as its avatar constitute a form of epistemological dissidence because they humanize politics by creating the space for the un-rational to manifest itself. The Iranian Revolution is an historical phenomenon that builds its legitimacy on spiritual fundamentals re-actualizing in contemporaneity a mythical ethos. Khomeini is a historical figure that mobilizes masses in a way only a man with charisma can – because the Charismatic authority rejects the world as a mechanism striving to meet the “spiritual” needs of humanity (detaching the human being from its everydayness). Charisma is a major revolutionary factor, an element that prepares a moment of kairós – where the divine and material meet for an instant. But the moment of this convergence is ephemeral. In this paper, I will try to analyze the problem of the sacred in the political, showing how the Iranian Revolution appeared as a long time struggle for authenticity and self-awareness (as a reaction to the process of westernization). My

analysis will reveal the reasons why a re-“spiritualization” of politics is so tempting (showing the limits of the managerial politics) outlining in the same time the limits of such a demarche - because in politics, religion, theology and spirituality are detached and dislocated from the transcendental and routinized by human everydayness.

**Keywords:** Modernity, Politics, Religion, Iran, Khomeini, Authenticity, Dasein, Kairos.

### **Modernity as “totality” - The World as a Picture**

For the German philosopher Martin Heidegger “the fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture” (Heidegger, 1977: 134). The meaning of this phenomenon can be de-codified by analyzing the re-articulation of the relationship between the human subject and the World who becomes objectified. The “human subject through its rational and technological self-assertion empties the world of mystical presence” (Carlson, 2003). By this, man becomes the measure of all; he conquers the intelligible, subordinates’ nature and entraps himself in a totalized world that becomes his own prison. The World is reduced to its essential aspects that can be understood and used as means of providing the material well-being and commodity of the subject. “The technologies of image reproduction in the modern world alter the limits of time and space” (Benjamin, 1968) or as Jeff Malpas explains “Within the reign of technological modernity, space no longer separates things, distance is no longer a barrier to access or availability and consequently the difference between what is near and what is far is immensely reduced if not obliterated. The very concreteness and particularity of things tends to be covered over by this obliteration of difference”. (Wrathall, Malpas, 2000: 225) Things themselves are replaced with images or representations (Vorstellungen) within a particular “frame” and in a way that is abstracted from their original locatedness (Wrathall, Malpas, 2000: 225-226). The distance that could preserve the aura or sacrality of things (Benjamin, 1968) is dissolved in this hyper-technological utopia.

This “totalization” is rooted in the epistemological nature of the modern age who conceives truth no longer in terms of any revelation but in terms of the self-certainty of the representing subject. By this we become witnesses of an emerging culture of “total presence” which creates an apocalyptic totality defined by the deepest anonymity of God (Khatami, 2008). Martin Heidegger points out that the “fundamental modern form in which the consciousness of self-which models everything upon itself and

which orders all beings accordingly - is the State. It is for this reason why "Politics" become the normative self-certitude of "historical" consciousness. "Politics" would determine it-self from a History conceived according to the norms of consciousness - that is, according to a "technological" experience." He then adds "Politics" is the completion of History. It is thus precisely because Politics constitutes the historic-technological and fundamental certitude of all action: such that "Politics" shall be characterized by the utter and unconditional absence of all questioning of itself. This un-conditionality of "Politics" and its Totality go hand in hand." (Froment-Meurice, 1995: 182) It is precisely this type of "Politics" that makes modernity possible as a global framework that entraps and alters the multiplicity of socio-cultural manifestations, transforming politics into "Politics".

### **Authenticity and the historical Dasein**

This ultra-rational, technological nature of "Politics" imposes the same rhythm of historical experience, uniting the historical timing of different political events subordinating them to the same mechanism. This is a Faustian world in which "all that is organic agonizes in the all-encompassing organization" and in which civilization has itself become a machine that does or wants to do everything mechanistically (Beistegui, 2002: 69-70). The only way to escape this auto-referential, mechanical totalitarianism is through a radical rupture made possible by "Das Augenblick" or the "Moment of vision" which is a form of "secular epiphany that both explodes and transcends the "fallen" character of routinized inauthentic temporality" (Wolin, 1990 :31-32) . The "moment of vision" introduces a "state of exception" into the mechanical movement of "world time" disrupting the hegemonic hold of inauthentic temporality. It is only in this short moment of disruption when Dasein can regain its authentic state of existence. In this, Heidegger is echoed in Carl Schmitt's writings, because in order to escape the "world time", "the moment of vision" must be followed by the moment of decision "entschlossenheit" made possible by the willingness to resolve, because "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception." (Wolin, 1994:

In this moment the "Human Dasein...is a being for whom its own existence is an issue", by being an issue for itself, being is dislocated from its inauthentic form of being "They", or "Authentic Being-one's-Self takes the definite form of an existential modification of the "They"" (Wolin, 1990: 34). For Heidegger, the fundamental trait of "They" is the self-forgetting of thy Self, the obliteration of the self into the "dictatorship of the "They".

Heidegger points out that ““They” has always kept Dasein from taking hold of its possibilities of Being, hiding the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities” but that “this process can be reversed” only “if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the “They” (Heidegger, 1962: 313). Dasein represents the struggle for the possibilities of the self as opposed to the petrified concreteness of “They”. This “They”, is the emblematic image of modernity, the closure of all possibility into a routinized universe of technological predictability.

**The revolutionary moment, kairos and the meaning of the historical now**

For some contemporary thinkers, the only chance to escape this “totalizing” all-encompassing project of modernity – in order to regain authenticity – is a revolutionary act that can escape the “machine”. Whether they are left-wing academics, Counter-Enlightenment intellectuals, Islamic traditionalists, or postmodernists, these thinkers have in common the strive to rearticulate the world in a manner that is more humane in the sense that it regains the specter of possibilities and multi dimensionality. The acute need of “difference”, the longing for the “self” constructs an ideatic line that miraculously bring along apparently antagonistic figures such as De Maistre and Foucault (see Wolin, 2004). Modernity sees itself (at least in these intellectual instances) thrown under critical interrogation because, in specific circumstances, the creative nature of the human being can’t be suppressed by the mechanics of its own creation. The stake of this intellectual demarche is to disable the totalitarian reflexes of politics that try to circumscribe it into “Politics”. This opens up the uni-polar universality of the Enlightenment to a new, multi-polar reality which gives way to un-numbered possibilities of human expression – social, cultural, political.

In our case, the advent of the Iranian Revolution inscribes itself into this global event of epistemological dissidence. The ethos of Shi’ia Islam and its symbolism has been re-actualized in the context of modernity that was being perceived as an unjust rule imposed upon the community of believers by alien forces. This tension between past and present, myth and reality created the amalgamated discourse of Khomeinism. Utilizing political concepts introduced by both secular and religious intellectuals, Khomeini developed a hybrid discourse that contained and accommodated elements of Third World-ism, Radicalism, Populism and Islam. An ideological mix that mobilized masses reshaped the political landscape and made the tradition of Shi’ia Islam actual. The Iranian intellectual context is

best described by Ashk Dahlén who thinks that “the essential epistemological and ontological question for Shi'i jurists and intellectuals in the encounter with modernity was... one of authenticity.”(Dahlen, 2003:105) The voice of the Iranian intellectuals was like a “call of conscience” (Ruf des Gewissens) that paved the way for authentic decision (Entschlossenheit) thereby elevating Dasein above the fallenness of the They (Wolin, 1990: 40). This was possible because “in each historical situation, a new kairos” arises “as possibility and as demand out of our present, however dark that present and however limited its possibilities may appear (Gilkey, 2005: 139). Kairos must be understood as a special moment of “fullness of time”. For Freire, the moment of kairos is characterized by a dynamism that opens up an individual to new knowledge that reveals one’s limit situation. An ecstatic moment, when Dasein increases its ontological vocation “to be more humane”. For Origen “kairos denotes a quality of action in time, when an event of outstanding significance occurs... a moment of time when a prophecy was pronounced... when a prophecy is fulfilled” (P. Tzamalikos, 2007:130). For Karl Lowith, kairos is an historical now, which opens the horizon for past as well as for future, “uniting the past as preparation with the future as consummation,” (Karl Lowith, 2011: 186). For the stoics the Kairos is “the abrupt and sudden conjunction where decision grasps opportunity and life is fulfilled in the moment”. In this instance the “Infinite, quantified time is...at once delimited and made present”. Within itself the “Kairos distils different times (‘omnium temporum in unum collatio’) and within it the sage is master of himself and at his ease, like a god in eternity”. This is an event, “which radically removes man from servitude to quantified time (‘qui cotidie vitae suae summam manum imposuit, non-indigent tempore’).” (Giorgio Agamben, 1993: 110-111)

For Tillich, the whole concept of kairos emerges from “a discussion with utopia”. He points out that while kairos represents a decisive breakthrough of eternity into time, “it also carries the caveat that there can be not state of eternity within time.” Tillich than ads “There are kairoi, but there is no utopian fulfillment. Revolutionary movements such as socialism, he argues, inevitably run the risk of utopian deception and disillusionment.” (Frederick J. Parrella, 1995: 91). The discussion about kairos must be also linked with Eliades’s definition of myths, which “describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred (or the "supernatural") into the World. It is this sudden breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes the World and makes it what it is today.”(Mircea Eliade, 1998: 6) The eternal can break into the temporal and a new beginning can take

place but everything is played out into an historical reality that can't find its end as fulfillment. (Paul Tillich, 1968: 534).

### **Khomeinism between the sacred and the political**

In this sense, the symbolism of the Iranian Revolution can be linked to a moment of *kairos*. An instance where everydayness is radically shaken by an event that drastically re-articulates history. In Hamid Dabashi's opinion, the Iranian Revolution and the figure of Khomeini "revived a religious consciousness without which men are thought to be trapped in a temporal mendacity...he has made it possible to believe again in the metaphysics of Ultimate" (Dabashi, 1993: 418). Dabashi explains how Khomeini heavily capitalized on the sacred days of the Islamic (Shi'ia) calendar "recalling the sacred memory of the occasion of a particular day - as Ashura, an Arba'iyn- and sending its energy in specific political directions." (Dabashi, 1993: 420-421). Khomeini, through this moment of "fullness of time" materialized in the Iranian Revolution makes the Shi'ia past a coherent reality of the present prepared for the future. The revolutionary act re-inscribes the Iranian society into a passing of time that embodies a spiritual dimension. Time passes with meaning, because everything is a preparation for the final Judgment, for the emergence of the Mahdi from occultation. To better understand the meaning of Khomeinism we must take a look at the history of Shi'ia theology, because in a way, the political concepts of Khomeinism are a fulfillment of long theological debates concerning authority. The kairoitic moment of revolution orders these long time theoretical "searches" into a coherent political-theological system made to rule and create an authentic historical Dasein.

### **The Shi'ia Political Theology**

The rise of the Safavid dynasty in the seventeenth century produced important mutations in the Iranian socio-cultural landscape. The Safavids under geopolitical pressure (from sunni powers such as the Ottomans, Uzbeks and Arabs) established a Shia state, changing in a profound way the structures of power and the cultural perspectives of the Persians. With almost no Shia theological tradition, the Safavid state imported scholars from areas such as Bahrain or Lebanon, opening the Persian space to the Arab world but in the same time producing a Shia tradition contained by Sunni Arab pressure (Roy, 1994: 169). This political reality had the gift to facilitate the development of an Iranianized Shiism and in the same time to bound Arab Shiite communities to Iranian clerics. This reciprocity of cultural, religious influences would set the regional borders (Iran,

Afghanistan) but in the same time also determine trans-border allegiances (Iran, Iraq) (Roy, 1994: 171-172). The Safavids gained legitimacy from Shiism and gave to the Shiites a state that would protect them. These rulers did not claim to be heirs of the Prophet but ruled on the behalf of the Hidden Imam with the help of the clergy. To rule in the name of the Hidden Imam was only possible by attributing a quintessential role to the clergy. As Kohlberg shows, the special position of the Imams in the Shiia theology (their infallibility), and conception of the world is derived from the notion of 'ilm (knowledge). This distinctive feature of Shi'ia authority becomes problematic in the period of Occultation (Ghayba) when this crisis of authority had to be solved. It is precisely in this moment when the authority of the 'ilm is transferred to the Ulama". In the process of transfer, the notion of alim became detached from that of the infallibility of the Imam and equated with the knowledge of the 'ulama' "(Arjomand, Kohlberg, 1988: 42).

### **The Akkbari, Usuli Divide**

The process of theological rearrangement was embodied by the conflict between the Akkbari and Usuli schools of thought. The Akkbaris had a literalist conception - they believed that the right or interpretation was closed after the Occultation of the Twelve Imam - a position more similar to that of the Sunnis. On the other hand the Usuli believed that the "Gates of interpretation" (Ijtihad) are open to the high Ulama. The Usuli vision prevailed, leading to the emergence of religious elite, namely the "Mujtahids". The "Mujtahids" were the only one entitled to practice Ijtihad, in other words, entitled to make religious decisions based on rational deduction from the traditional sources of law. This led to a hierarchical disposition of authority based on knowledge. Those without special religious knowledge had to choose a "source of emulation"/imitation, a "marja al-taqlid". A "Marja" representing a „fih“, a certain way of envisioning the Islamic jurisprudence. To this extent the Twelver Shiism has its own schools of jurisprudence divided by several interpretative authorities - represented by the „Marjas“. There is no clear institutional logic whatsoever behing the selection of a "Marja". Besides being a fully recognized mujtahid (musallam al-ijtihad) or fully qualified mujtahid (jami'al-sharayi) there is only the charisma and the ability to emulate that makes a person a "Marja"(Walbridge, 2001: 91). Some scholars suggest the the concept of "Marja" becomes in the eighteenth century a mode of conferring in some way an institutionalized hierarchy to the Shiia clergy.

An attempt to clarify the lines of authority. This process is clearly described by Abbas Amanat who states that "Usulism no doubt encouraged rationalization through deductive premises of conventional logic and thus legitimized clerical elitism by distinguishing a body of mujtahids for their expert knowledge. However, it never developed an institutionalized process for creating a complete pyramid. The emergence of supreme authority, which seems the logical culmination of any hierarchy in pre-modern times, was thus held back, at least in theory, by the presence (more accurately, the material absence) of the Imam." (Arjomand, Amanat, 1998: 101) This "occultation" of the Imam and then the absence of a coherent temporal authority after the fall of the Safavids created a multipolar disposition of clerical authorities - with autonomy in relation to the secular rule and great authority on the "followers".

### **The Shi'ia Ulama - constructing structures of meaning and power**

After the fall of the Safavid state in 1722 the clerical establishment had to fill the vacuum of power and took on a more participatory role in the Persian society. The role of the Ulama in keeping the social order was so important that when the Qajar dynasty came to power they tried to build their state by relying on the clergy's network of authority. The influence of the Ulama in the field of education and social matters also brought with itself some important drawbacks for the state. The Shiite clergy created pockets of authority that were hard to control. On the long term, these segments created currents of defiance and renewal - in this respect the clergy was in the same time the source of social coherence and social unrest. The seeds of renewal were contained in the concept of Ijtihad but they had to be reconciled with the natural disposition for state coherence and institutionalization. This paradoxical role of the clergy has had a dramatic impact on shaping the Iranian society in the last two centuries - the first Iranian Constitution, the end of the Qajar rule and the establishments of the Pahlavi dynasty are major event inconceivable without the clergy's contribution.

The Shiite doctrinal flexibility, the autonomy of each 'alim (the singular of ulama) judgment constructed an Iranian intellectual milieu - diverse in interpretations, theological debates and doctrinal renewal - appropriated to new historical circumstances. There is a strong linkage between the clergy as source of knowledge and the establishment of an Iranian intelligentsia. Olivier Roy points out that "The Shiite clergy is incontestably more open to the non-Islamic corpus than the Sunni ulamas. The ayatollahs are great readers (including of Marx and Feuerbach): there is something of the Jesuit

or Dominican in them.” (Roy, 1998: 172) In fact, the Iranian Ulama was to translate modernity - from a Shiite perspective - accommodating it to the local environment. If in the Qajar period the clerical establishment acquired the role of a mediator between the state and the rest of society, at the beginning of the twenties century they assumed the role of mediating the influence of western society. Often seen as a factor of stagnation the Shiite Ulama had in reality a complex role in keeping the social coherence domesticating ideological trends that desired a radical rearrangement of the Iranian society and culture. Shiism entered into a dialectical relation with the western epistemology, a process that gave birth to the current political reality - the synthesis, following the Hegelian scheme.

The Ulama as sources of knowledge had great authority over society and this authority meant power. The Shiite clerics became architects of social-historical blocs that strived for hegemony. The Ulama facilitated what Gramsci describes as “consent”, a strategic alliance between social forces who construct “hegemony”. The whole constitutional history of Iran is the effect of a social consent made possible by the clergy. The structural accomplishment of this Shiite articulation of society lays in the concept of *uulayat al-faqih* (governance by the jurisprudent) - the guardian who will guide the republic until the return of the hidden Imam - deriving his legitimacy from both religious and political authorities “he should be both one of the highest religious authorities (*marja’ al-taqlid*) and the political leader who “understands his time” (*agah be zaman*)” (Bradley, Fletcher, 2010: 179)

### **Khomeinism as a political Utopia**

When described by the Western press (especially the American one), Khomeini appears as an angry fanatical zealot, detached from the realities of the contemporary world, a captive of a universe of rudimentary dogmas. In reality, Khomeini is a complex historical figure which deserves a more detailed and thoroughly interpretation. He embodied the philosophical, theological and political tensions of his society and provided the ideological coherence for a situation of crisis.

Khomeini studied philosophy passionately. Reading Islamic thinkers such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi he developed a particular interest in the concept of *vahdat al-vojud* (unity of existence) and *tawheed* (unity of God). Influenced by this concept, Khomeini outlined man’s fundamental role in the divine plan with regard to the creation. He was especially interested in the role of the saint or the prophet among the community of men

(Moghaddam, 2014: 18). By this, Khomeini embarked on the quest to find the ideal human being (Isane-e Kamel). Following Ibn Arabi, He considered that the “development of this ideal human being must be the prime objective of the governance of the community” (Moghaddam, 18: 2014).

Another major philosophical influence on Khomeini was Mulla Sadra who provided an account of the spiritual development experienced by the mystic showing he's obligations toward the community of the faithful arising from his seemingly individualistic quest. Mulla Sadra divided this spiritual journey into four stages corresponding to the mystics degree of spiritual attainment “in the first stage, man travels from his self and the world to God; in the second, the journey takes him from God to God, as he oscillates between considerations of divine attributes and divine essence; in the third stage, man sets out on the road from God back to the world and his self; finally he begins to wander from man to man, bestowing on his community a new dispensation of spiritual and moral order.”(Knysh, 1992) Sadra’s description of the spiritual journey resonates with Ibn Arabi’s concept of the perfect man (al-insan al-kamil) in its particular emphasis on his function as a religious leader of the community of believers. In his later writings on Irfan, Khomeini tried to place the concept of the “perfect human” being in the context of cosmic processes (Knysh, 1992). In the *Misbah al-hidaya*, Khomeini explains how the metaphysical and cosmic functions of the “perfected human” are being linked to his soteriological mission. “The two aspects achieve a harmonious synthesis in the perfect man's role as God's "vicegerent" (khalifa), or "deputy" (na'ib), who represents the Deity in the created world with which guidance and preservation he is entrusted (Knysh). The timeless archetypal vicegerency is, in Khomeini's opinion, a model upon which all individual and "historical" prophetic (and saintly) missions are based. The perfect man “is the only creature in the world that is granted the vision of both God's intrinsic transcendence and His immanent presence in the events and things of material being. Khomeini points out that "his relationship to the world is that of the spirit to the body; he has attained the true existence, and, having abandoned the creaturely one, his body has become identical with the universal Body, his soul-with the universal Soul, and his spirit-with the universal Spirit.”(Knysh, 1992)

For Hamid Dabasi Khomeini is a “philosopher king” in the platonic understanding of the term. “As for Plato, “justice” was Khomeini’s principal political concern. Their just due had to be given to them. This

“giving to them” necessitated both leading them through a revolution and remaining in power to secure their worldly salvation. “

The “philosopher king” knows what is best for his subjects and see to it that they are “rightly guided” to the end. What doctrinally augmented and ideologically solidified this Platonic assumption on Khomeini’s part, with a long historical translation of the platonic ideal into the fabric of Islamic political philosophy, was the notion of the “ perfect man” (al-insan al-kamil), whereby , in the mythical tradition, the path to spiritual perfection (rendered into political truth) is guided by a master (or morshed). Superseding the philosophical discourse by the mystical, Khomeini could only benefit from the enduring political implications of such powerful traits in Persian and Islamic intellectual history.

Khomeini’s theological thought and concepts could be very easily converted in political argumentations. He considered that people are imperfect, and that by their own they could estrange from the path towards Divinity. In these conditions the incomplete man needs to be guided towards perfection by the “perfect man”. The concept of the “perfect man” is here analogous with the Supreme Jurist and the Islamic Government that have the task to guide the community so that it respects and follows the law of God, there by pursuing the path towards God. (Dabashi, 1993: 442). Vanessa Martin shows how Khomeini's concept of velayat al faqih, was influenced by concepts of governance found in traditional Islamic philosophy - post-Suhrawardian traditions and Ibn Rushd's concept of Shari’ at as the law of an ideal state. In Khomeini’s perspective, the “philosopher through his absorption of knowledge by presence, possesses understanding beyond the ordinary jurist, it is the philosopher who should govern yet by virtue of his familiarity with Islamic law. The traditional philosopher consequently emerges as a jurist”. Khomeini considered Islamic law “not only as ethics but worship as well as governance, he maintained that Islamic government is the rule of the qanun-i ilahl (divine law) upon people” (Dahlen, 2003: 115). In one of his speeches, in July 1979 Khomeini declared that “Islam is to take all perceptions and the entire world back to the level of tauhid ... It is to return all nature and all oppressive shadows to that place of light which is finally the place of divinity ...” (Vanessa Martin, 2003: 153)

### **The Utopian deception - On the imanentization of the sacred in politics**

As a correspondent for the “Corriere de la Serra”, Foucault visited Iran and had the living experience of the Iranian Revolution. The energy of the

moment mesmerized the French philosopher who discovered in the spiritual movement of Khomeini the force and authenticity that lacked in the European political landscape. He wrote in connection with the Iranian Revolution that we have to “make that this political life is not like, as always, an obstacle of the spiritual but its receptacle, its occasion, its ferment” Foucault saw in the Iranian Revolution a unique moment in history, very specific and contrasting with other modern revolutions. This event brought with itself what Foucault would name “spiritual politics”. According to Foucault, Shi’ism brought to the Iranian people “the promise and guarantee of finding something that would radically change their subjectivity” (Foucault 2013: 217-218). He was “particularly intrigued by the new revolutionary phenomenon found in religion and the way the “spiritual” (a ‘highly prized additional level of meaning’) mobilizes a “political will””.

The French philosopher was seduced by this unworldly force of the spirit that could mobilize and reshape the material world, but he lacked the capacity to escape the utopia of the moment. What Foucault was unable to foresee in this instance, was the dissipation of this kairotic moment into everydayness. He failed to apply his own philosophical conception to this event which tempted him out of his own reasoning. The charismatic force of Khomeini achieved almost mythical dimension. The force of his image was so powerful that it won the hearts of millions of Iranians inspiring also European philosophers such as Foucault. It is the very force of the charismatic figure about which Max Webber speaks of, because the “charismatic authority rejects the world, organization, routine, stability, and everydayness...it strives to meet the “spiritual” needs of humanity as opposed to its material needs.” - But then, Webber makes it clear that at some point even a charismatic movement must make its peace with the world. By this, charismatic authority becomes “routinized” and rationalized. It is precisely what happened with Khomeini’s figure, which was institutionalized and nationalized. Entrapped in the political “religion, theology and spirituality are detached and dislocated from a transcendent order and become strategies which shape, control and dictate the patterns of human experience” (Carette, 1999: 6). Foucault in one of his lectures in 1979, tried to show how the “spiritual’ (religious and theological) can be suspended in the ‘political’ and the ‘material’, where the ‘spiritual’ is ‘political’ and the ‘political’ is ‘spiritual’, where these terms dissolve into the same network of power relationships, fighting for space ... the ‘spiritual’ becomes a form of discursive power in the attempt to win territory in the governance of human life “(Carette, 1999: 140-141). We must

understand that Charisma, the historical Dasein or the kairotic moments have a fleeting and ephemeral nature, in the flashes of their manifestation we can glimpse the divine moment of the human but we cannot contain the divine (see Rickey, 2002: 6). That's why we must interpret the political reality with an "eschatological reservation" as the theologian Erick Peterson insisted, because the "political and contingent reality must be understood as provisional, never as the fulfillment of God's will". (Schmitt, Hoelzl, Ward, 2008: 9)

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