

GLOBALIZATION, NATION-STATE, AND GLOBAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

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Abstract

Like “imperialism” in the beginning of the 20th century, “power” in the 1950-s, “interdependence” in the 1970-s, “globalization” is one of the signposts of today’s political analysis. It marks a wide range of phenomena, covering all major fields of social life. The world globalises economically, technologically, politically, ecologically and in a number of other ways. Literally speaking, globalization affects everything; and every theory in political science has something to say about the causes, impacts, and effects produced by it. This article focuses on the specific impact globalization has upon the nation-state as a central element of international politics and the ways it affects global security. It provides a theoretical framework for further empirical investigations. The political dimension of globalization is under examination, and, more specifically, the way it transforms international politics. First, key theoretical approaches to globalization will be critically examined. Then, the impact of globalization on the nation-state – still a primary international relations unit – will be revisited. The article will be summarized by discussing the ways globalization challenges, transforms and enhances global security arrangements.

Introduction

It’s been a common wisdom that globalization provides additional opportunities not only for states and societies, but for the whole international order as well. By bringing people closer and enhancing communication tools, it ameliorates misperception and reduces the deficit of information in world politics, thus bringing more security and less violence. This article aims to critically analyze such a notion. The analysis is theoretical. It determines the main features of globalization and outlines the general ways it impacts global security. More empirical research can be carried out for specifying the impact, for which this article can provide a theoretical background. By approaching globalization as a complex phenomenon, it will concentrate on its political implications. It will be argued that globalization creates a context for the transformation of the role of the state in world politics without being a direct cause. By influencing internal political and (more broadly) social processes, it 1) undermines state’s monopoly in international relations; and 2) creates a context for a

further deterioration of state sovereignty as a key principle of the world order.

Globalization, it'll be argued, exerts more direct influence upon international security. More specifically, it reduces time lag for decision making (thus multiplying crisis-like situations), leads to an increase in structural violence by unevenly affecting various societies, produces asymmetric threats, shifts the balance of power, and provides a new context of ideas for world politics. That does not mean more security, but it does mean new challenges.

The article opens with a comparative analysis of the key theoretical approaches to globalization in international relations theory. Next, the transformation of the role of the state is examined. Finally, globalization's impact on global security is assessed.

Globalization in International Politics: Key Theoretical Explanations

Since globalization is a multifaceted, complex phenomenon, it can be explained in a number of alternative ways. Even within an international relations framework there are numerous theoretical explanations, which generally follow the lines of the "great" paradigmatic debates. Realism (neorealism), neoliberal institutionalism, and neomarxism provide the most influential tools for understanding the way globalization affects international politics, while constructivism puts more emphasis on building it into a broader context of social interaction. For realists, globalization is a reflection of great powers' struggle for supremacy. It helps exploit great powers' advantages and is being promoted by those which benefit more than others. As a result, globalization is just another context for everlasting struggle for hegemony (Gilpin, 2000, Mearsheimer, 2003). Neoliberals treat globalization as the gradual construction of a liberal world order, a deepening of global interdependence. By rewarding more cooperative strategies, globalization brings absolute gains to the top of world politics, thus encouraging more peaceful and less violent interactions (Eichengreen, 1996, Keohane, 2002). Neomarxists attribute globalization to the logic of capitalist expansion and evolution. From this perspective, globalization is seen as a new form of imperialism (Callinicos, 2001). Thus, theoretical difficulties start with the very definition of "globalization". For some, predominantly realists, globalization is a transformation of environment, in which power politics among states is being carried out. For some, mainly neoliberals, globalization is a growing economic interdependence. For numerous others, globalization is about technological

and communicational changes, which make the world “smaller”, while accelerating all political interactions. Symbols of globalization vary from the internet and McDonald’s to the G-7 (Harvey, 1996, Appadurai, 1996, Eriksen, 2001).

The universal concept of globalization needs to be defined more strictly and within a context of international security studies. We believe it is more about a dynamic process within the international system than its structure; and is therefore more of a cause than an effect of ongoing political changes in global security arrangements. By defining globalization as a process and labelling it an independent variable, we by and large share realistic assumptions on how globalization changes world politics (or leaves it unchanged).

Realists rely on two core beliefs which shape their view on globalization. First, they place the state in the centre of international politics. And secondly, they prioritise “high politics” over “low politics”. Thus, globalization is mainly seen as a process which transforms the context of interstate relations. The effects it produces are seen at the political level, even if the nature of the changes tends to be predominantly economic (Waltz, 1999, Gilpin, 2000).

Both beliefs are at the heart of the realist paradigm, thus none of them can be thrown away entirely. Assuming the central role of a state and keeping an eye on political changes, realists arrive at the conclusion that globalization is nothing new. The world had already experienced a sharp growth in trade and direct investment in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Just as the growing economic interdependence was unable to prevent the outbreak of World War I, the current globalization (mainly economic) cannot fundamentally change the political structure of the international system (Krasner, 1999). As in the pre-globalization era, international outcomes are determined by the distribution of forces and balances of power among states. Globalization can accelerate structural changes by providing more opportunities for some states, but it is not a structural change itself.

Just as in the pre-1914 world, globalization is not a universal phenomenon. If captured in economic terms of growth in trade and interdependence, it involves predominantly highly developed states, leaving aside the whole of continents like Africa. To some it may be a reason to claim globalization is a destabilizing factor in world politics, since it challenges balance of power

mechanisms of international order. However, bringing more inequality to the international system does not necessarily mean making it less stable.

Anyhow, realists tend to limit the scope and significance of globalization. Basically, there are two primary ways in which globalization impacts global security: 1) by producing economic changes, which are converted into balance of power shifts; and 2) by changing the environment, in which nation-states operate, thus transforming patterns of cooperation and competition among them. The former usually works by changing the relative economic power of the states. Since economy is a key power indicator for most realists, they assume that changes in relative economic capabilities inevitably lead to shifts in distribution of power globally (Singer and Small, 1972; Waltz, 1979; Wolforth, 1999; Mearshaimer, 2001). This works much like the process of modernization in Organsky's power transition theory (Organsky and Kugler, 1980). Sooner or later economic outcomes "produce" new great powers and weaken old ones. This transforms the structure of the international system and creates both new challenges and opportunities for global security.

Changes in the environment are harder to recognize, since realists tend to preserve its basic feature – anarchy. States have to operate under conditions of uncertainty, and globalization can do nothing about that. However, globalization can shift priorities in this anarchical environment, making states engage in economic wars, intensifying competition for access to mechanisms, which in turn will help get more control over globalization outcomes. If states believe economy is an important determinant of power and if globalization is mainly about economic development, they will tend to place economic competition higher in the list of foreign policy strategies (Gilpin, 2000: 29). On the other hand, globalization may also stimulate interstate cooperation in cases where it could bring mutual gains, especially if those gains could be roughly equally divided.

The anarchy of the international system, the principles of self-help in a struggle for survival, and the centrality of the nation-state as a key decision-maker remain fundamental for realist analysis of globalization. So far, realists are able to explain much of what is happening in world politics under globalization, however, with some notable exceptions. One of them is the European integration process – an ongoing development which cast doubt upon the realistic picture of globalization as incapable of fundamentally transforming the way world politics operate.

The neoliberal account of globalization could do that by applying a key concept of interdependence. Through these lenses, world politics is seen differently. Both key realist assumptions – the centrality of a state and the utmost priority of “high politics” – are dismissed. Instead, neoliberals offer a theory of complex interdependence, according to which international relations are no longer a world of competing egoists, but that of cooperating partners (Keohane, 2002). Being interlocked by mutual interests, international actors tend to engage in long-term cooperation. It pays off better than unilateral strategies, since it helps to achieve a Pareto optimality in most situations. Driven by absolute rather than relative gains, states are no longer pure egoists. They apply cooperative strategies whenever it brings profit.

The world of cooperative partners will be affected by globalization in a different way than the one of the competing egoists. For neoliberals, globalization is not simply just a side process which influences power politics. It is a further development of a growing interdependence, which qualitatively transforms the principles of world politics. It does so by 1) bringing in non-state actors; and 2) shifting their priorities from military and strategic to economic and social needs. Due to these factors state borders, once heavily guarded, are becoming easy to cross. Goods, labour, and capital are free to move globally. Economic efficiency and competitiveness are primary determinants of international outcomes.

Driven by a need to enhance both, the states engage in long-term cooperation. Often this cooperation is institutionalized by creating an international organization or regime. By doing so, states aim at diminishing uncertainty and guaranteeing long-term commitments. International organizations and regimes are designed to manage various problems collectively – and that helps states develop tools for joint decision-making, coordination, and the construction of norms, which in turn reduce comparative effectiveness on unilateral actions. All that challenges the anarchical nature of world politics, since states voluntarily give up some parts of their freedom of actions for the sake of more predictable partnership. In other words, economic interdependence produces political implications. That’s why neoliberals assume that globalization can spill-over to political levels by establishing institutionalized norms of international interactions.

Unlike realists, neoliberals consider globalization both unique and universal. The latter means that globalization cannot be attributed to a

particular region. It is a world-wide process of structural change and even the states which seem to be out of the influence of globalization are affected by it. To neoliberals, globalization is also unique in the sense that it has no historical precedents. There were periods when international economy and trade boomed, but they were different from what we're witnessing now. In 1914 world politics was done by economically interdependent states, while in 2009 it is an interplay of a variety of actors. Moreover, in 1914 states (as the primary actors) were still guided by the principles of self-help and egoism, operating under anarchy. Today neoliberals argue that a growing interdependence can help reduce anarchy, ameliorate the security dilemma, and thus transform the way states perceive each other's intentions. They believe it will bring more peace and less violence in the long run and thus globalization is a stabilizing process.

The neoliberal account of globalization is probably the simplest. By and large, it is a continuation of the model of interdependence on the global level. However, the liberal approach finds it difficult to explain striking differences over regions in scope, forms and consequences of globalization.

Neomarxism - a third major paradigm - can provide an explanation. From neomarxist positions, globalization is seen as a deepening imbalance in the international system, enforcing neo-colonial exploitation worldwide. The concept of structural violence is the most fundamental here.

The world is seen by neomarxists as a very unfair place. It is unequally developed, and even worse, developed states ("the centre") are gaining additional profits from exploiting the underdeveloped "periphery". The combined population of the most developed states is often called "a golden billion" within the neomarxist school. The golden billion, predominantly in Western Europe, North America and East Asia, enjoys unfairly large incomes, while five billion people suffer serious economic and social collapses. That is possible because structural violence is applied by the most developed states to organize the international structure in such a way as to give highly developed states the upper hand in most of the situations of interdependence.

Globalization reinforces this unfairness by being -in essence- another application of structural violence. This process is mainly seen as organized by the most developed states in order to spread their values and lift barriers to economic expansion. In this sense it is closely approaching "Americanization" or more broadly, "Westernization". It is assumed that

the USA, being the most powerful international actor, articulates certain rules for all other states to follow (Kapstein, 1999). This notion can be broadened: each hegemon in the international system aims at imposing his values and norms upon the whole system. By reasoning in this fashion, a neomarxist account of globalization resembles the realist one: globalization is nothing new, since each time a hegemon appeared in the international system, the latter experienced globalization in some form.

Being a form of structural violence, globalization cannot effectively provide peace, neomarxists argue. Instead, it will lead to a growing disparity, stimulate asymmetric conflicts, and enhance social polarization on the global scale.

These various theoretical approaches to globalization have one thing in common. All of them pay attention to material aspects of globalization: the way it shifts the balance of power, enhances mutually beneficial cooperation or deepens inequality. Constructivists offer an alternative understanding of globalization based on analysis of ideas rather than material capabilities.

Constructivism proceeds from the assumption that political concepts obtain meaning only within a social context. Notions like "peace", "war", "security" or "power" are empty unless put into a certain way of thinking about the world and in particular- international politics. Thus, constructivists doubt the objective nature of anarchy in international politics, considering it a product of the realist way of thinking (Wendt, 1999).

If this is the case then, globalization's most important implication would be the way ideas and perception of political processes are transformed. Initially, all states are unique, thus the perceptions of world politics are numerous. These perceptions form the international environment and in turn are by-products of social interactions. Differences in perceptions are connected to the difference in identity, which can be a source of conflict (the most famous forecast of which is presented by Samuel Huntington) (Huntington, 1996). By changing the normative content of social systems, globalization creates a unified international environment, thus providing a universal meaning for political concepts. That means that globalization is a transformation in the minds of people, rather than in the material capabilities of states.

The four mentioned paradigms offer strikingly different explanations for globalization. Although we intuitively have a rather similar picture of McDonalds, the internet, intercontinental airlines, CNN and student exchange programs as being identification marks of globalization, a more in-depth study would offer rather different options. Realists would pay attention to how globalization alters the balance of power in the international system, while preserving its anarchical nature and the centrality of power. By doing so, globalization breeds suspicion, increases the costs of foreign policy miscalculations, and creates new types of threats. The neoliberal account of globalization rests upon the assumption that the very nature of security has changed. Due to a growing interdependence, states can no longer be the only providers of security. Networks of mutual interest in a globalized transnational world transform the way states define and pursue security goals. World politics will become more cooperative, with long-term goals prevailing over short-term ones and pushing states towards institutionalized cooperation. Neomarxists blame globalization for increased inequality. By enhancing structural violence, it produces asymmetric threats and actually *provokes* global instability. Cooperation flourishes not globally, but among clusters of states, mostly among the highly developed. Finally, constructivism emphasizes the meaning of perception and social context, which both are influenced by globalization. It impacts world politics by providing values, norms, and ways of thinking, which could be shared among societies. In this case, security could be enhanced by reducing problems of misperception, lowering the intensity of the security dilemma, and providing elements of shared identity for various societies.

One of the most important developments, attributed to globalization, is the transformation of the role and functions of the nation-state.

Nation-States in a Globalized World

Globalization affects a lot of things. Among them is the status of the nation-state in the international system. Being the central -or as some argue- the only international actors, states today are facing a challenge of losing both their monopoly on international affairs and parts of their sovereignty.

The former is by and large the result of a growing level of interdependence. States' domination over international relations rested upon the ability to control all vital spheres of cross-border interactions. States waged wars, defined rules for trade and investment, possessed capabilities to effectively control migration, and kept an eye on borders, preventing any undesirable

interference. Moreover, the essence of international relations was concentrated in “high politics”, which was predominantly about military and strategic issues. Being holders of absolute control over military and diplomatic interactions, states were able to decisively influence the rest of international affairs. Thus, international relations were in essence *interstate* relations.

However, starting from the 1950s, things have changed. Enhancements in conventional weaponry and the introduction of weapons of mass destruction made direct violence much more costly. At the same time, developments in world economy and international trade reinforced that effect and stimulated more cooperative strategies. Together these factors shifted a cost/benefit pattern for direct violence as a strategic choice, making it much less attractive.

A decreasing demand for violence produced a fall in the comparative value of “high politics”, thus diminishing or even denying states’ comparative advantages. Instead of concentrating on military and strategic issues, it has become more urgent to effectively manage problems of multilateral economic interdependence, social interactions, environmental degradation and the like. These problems were much better solved through non-state mechanisms.

A growing economic interdependence and the spill-over effects it produced gave way to a boom of non-state international actors. Transnational corporations have gradually become the symbols of new power centers in the international economy. These entities operate across state borders, while pursuing interests of their own, not the national interests of the states they formally belong to. Annual turnover of the largest of them is bigger than most of the state budgets. Interactions among them are becoming increasingly important for determining international outcomes in world politics.

International organizations of various kinds are another form of non-state actors. Some of them are created by the states and can be, in one way or another, included into patterns of interstate relations. However, the vast majority of them are non-governmental in nature. They are in no way connected to state interests and pursue a wide range of goals by enhancing transnational communication. As a result, alternative sources of the rules and norms of international interaction appear. States can no longer arrange world politics in way which suits them most.

Since trans-border communication has become easier, a host of transnational actors get access to shaping the way world politics operates. Cooperation among them no longer heavily depends on geographical proximity or the goodwill of governments. Functional interactions flourish globally, strengthening lobby groups, civil movements, political associations and the like. That is becoming another source of the eroding of the monopoly of the nation-states in world politics.

Along with losing monopoly in international affairs, states are also experiencing a weakening of their sovereignty. Arguably, this is the most significant change in the world order setting since 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Year War. According to its provisions, sovereign states became the core elements of the international system. They replaced variety of international actors, which included the Emperor, the Pope, dynasties, orders and the like. Starting from the mid-17th century, international relations have been interstate.

The key attribute of a state was its sovereignty. However, sovereignty was double-headed. On the one hand, internal sovereignty implied that no other will within a state can be higher than that of a monarch. Later, with the development of republicanism, that imperative was reformulated and “a monarch” was replaced by “a state”. On the other hand, external sovereignty assured formal equality of states in international affairs, the absence of any supreme political will, which could be imposed on the states. The latter was arguably the source of everlasting anarchy in international politics. Installation of the state sovereignty was the result of the internal development of European societies, in particular of the strengthening of centralized absolutism in most of the major European powers. The philosophical background for the concept of state sovereignty was provided by Thomas Hobbes in his famous *Leviathan*. Although Hobbes was mainly generalizing the experience of the English Revolution, to which he was a witness, his theory also got applied to the international realm.

Since then, sovereignty has been recognized as a fundamental principle of international relations, although some argue that this principle was no more than “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner, 1999). Sovereign states were the most effective in managing problems of security for more than 300 years. That was the case as long as security was mainly concentrated in the

realm of “high politics”, and interstate mechanisms, such as flexible coalitions, were the most reliable guarantors of states’ survival.

With the increased complexity of the international system, the task of providing security became complicated. State sovereignty, once the highest priority, suddenly has turned into an obstacle to maximizing other possible outcomes. Having already lost their monopoly on international politics, states found themselves in a position of losing parts of their sovereignty. To be more precise, sovereignty was not lost, but transferred from national to other levels: supranational and regional.

The supranational level of decision-making was pioneered by the European integration movement. Political realism, the most influential theory in the 1950s, faced profound difficulties in explaining why states would voluntarily give up their sovereignty in exchange for economic benefits. Adequate solutions to this theoretical problem were offered by functionalism, neofunctionalism and integration theory, which in different ways described how and why sovereignty could be given up (Mitrany, 1975; Haas, 1964; Wallace, 1994). Economic interdependence among developed countries made mutually beneficial long-term cooperation more attractive than any short-term goals. The need to deepen economic cooperation produced a stimulus to develop norms and institutions to regulate it. At this point, state sovereignty has become a problem for the states, which aimed at maximizing economic profits. Establishment of the first European supranational institutions, which were capable of imposing their regulations upon sovereign states, was a symbolic end of the Westphalian system.

Further deepening of European integration and similar processes in other regions demonstrated that economic integration tended to produce political implications. The supranational level of decision-making in this case differs from the earlier examples, such as interstate coalitions. The latter did not require losing state sovereignty, while integration did. The European Union today is a supranational structure, where some decisions concerning Germans, Britons or Poles, are taken in Brussels.

While some parts of state sovereignty went to the supranational level, some others were transferred to regional institutions and regimes. That was done with the same aim of maximizing the efficiency of their foreign policies. When the world has become transnational and more interdependent, the problems of economic and social development, environmental protection,

illegal migration, drugs and crime, got more importance. To solve them, states engaged into regional cooperation. That was effective, since states of the same regions tend to have similar problems. Thus, a developing regionalism shifted some decision-making processes from national to regional or local levels.

Two notions should be made about integration and regionalization. First, they are not universal. Both trends could be observed among highly developed states. It looks like in order to get involved in high-level interdependence, a state must enjoy a fairly high level of economic development. As has already been mentioned, only about 15-20% of the world's population lives in economically developed states; those which are now going through the process of integration. The rest of the world still remains within the realities once described by realists. Poor states have nothing to exchange their sovereignty for, thus it survives as a key priority.

Secondly, there is no direct causal link between transformation of state sovereignty and globalization. Both processes reinforce each other, but could well take place alone. Globalization can be dated back to at least the Age of Discovery. Its effects could be observed both when state sovereignty was still under formation and when it has already become a fundamental principle of world politics. State sovereignty, on the other hand, emerged as a result on internal political developments. These developments could not be stopped by globalization alone, and for quite a period of time sovereignty remained the most effective way of providing security. Only when globalization was added by growing interdependence and "low politics" issues get considerably more attention, are preconditions for giving up state sovereignty met. Earlier impacts of globalization - i.e. of transformations of space and time bringing the world closer - did not challenge state sovereignty. For several centuries, growing interdependence and the strengthening of a state came along together, with both processes reaching zenith in the 20th Century. Even today, the general trend of eroding sovereignty does not preclude countries where states are getting stronger. At the same time, these states can be fully integrated into the processes of globalization.

Erosion of state sovereignty is driven by internal social developments, surfacing of new ideologies and the rise of non-state actors, both national and transnational. Globalization provides a new context for these developments, making a state-centered foreign policy less effective.

Globalization's Impact on Global Security

As a complex multidimensional process, globalization neither enhances nor deteriorates global security. It rather transforms the environment in which states operate, creating both new challenges and options for the provision of security.

The most direct implication of globalization is bringing the world closer, both in a geographic and temporal sense. Communication is becoming cheaper, faster and more reliable. Due to this, states and other actors often have to make decisions in real time, without any lags for additional consideration. A shortened time for decision-making is typical for crises and is closely connected to higher levels of uncertainty. Thus international politics is becoming more "crisis-like", demanding immediate reactions. Just as in a crisis, this increases the value of possible errors and complicates strategic interactions in general. This feature of globalization can be generally characterized as destabilizing, since it increases the probability of mistaken decisions in international affairs.

By unevenly affecting various regions and countries, globalization certainly creates preconditions for direct violence. However, a more immediate consequence of this is an increase in structural violence. By benefiting control over information and communication flows, possession of high technologies, social mobility, and economic capabilities- globalization creates structural preferences for the highly developed states. The already existing disparities between North and South are getting deeper. Less developed states are facing a winless dilemma: either to join in the globalization processes in whatever sphere they can and get a couple of additional points of annual growth, or try to stay out of it for as long as possible. Both outcomes are pessimistic. In the former case, small absolute gains are turning into relative losses. Besides, the price non-developed societies have to pay for getting access to globalization "benefits" is sometimes too high. In the latter case, isolation will be the result. Torn by that dilemma, numerous societies are accumulating latent conflict potential which increases instability and risk in the international system.

Globalization also poses another dilemma by offering a strategic choice between two models of development, called by Benjamin Barber "Jihad" and "McWorld" (Barber, 1996). Unlike constructivists, who believe that unification of meaning is a by-product of globalization, Barber offers an alternative approach. Globalization forces societies to react and there are two possible ways in which to react. The first is an emergence of a

“McWorld”, unified by common values, cultural standards, and openness. In such a world, free market principles and information technologies will shape universal consumption. Globalization in this case will mean “unification” in the long run. But another option is also possible. Reaction to globalization may take form of a protest, resulting in cultivating cultural and civilizational differences among societies. Western values will be opposed by principles of exclusive identity, cultural pluralism, and autonomous systems of norms. Both models are possible in the modern international system and discrepancy between them, as well as a necessity to make a civilizational choice, could add instability on the global scale.

Globalization is likely to provoke asymmetric threats. Due to increased gaps in technological and military developments, weaker actors are likely to exploit their non-conventional advantages. The most vivid asymmetric danger – international terrorism – can be added to other techniques, targeted against the comparative weaknesses of conventionally superior societies, e.g. high value of human life, vulnerability of communication lines, sensibility to mass media and the like. New lines of confrontation may appear in every sphere of life. The most dangerous development here is a possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Technological competition, promoted by globalization, can reinforce arms races and thus provoke violent conflicts and unilateral actions. However, incentives to unilateralism will be counter-weighted by the growing importance of “soft power”. States will have to look for additional legitimacy for their foreign policies, which will make foreign policy actions more moderate (Nye, 2001).

Globalization will also change traditional balance-of-power politics, pursued by the states. Instead of being involved in formal coalition building and arithmetical calculation of military build-ups, states are likely to balance each other in framing decision-making procedures and norms. In other words, they will be competing for structural power, not the attributive one. To this end they are likely to use institutions and international organizations; lobby their interests while trying to deny opponents’ access to framing rules of international politics. The consequences of these developments are unclear. States will engage in more competitive relations within a broader set of contexts, while at the same time competing in structural power will help minimize the destabilizing effect of miscalculations in assessing relative hard power.

Competition in structural power seems less anarchical and thus carries less risk with regard to international security.

Changes in power assets, produced by globalization, are likely to introduce rapid changes in power rankings. Those who were weak can suddenly become strong, especially if they possess some degree of control over information flows, highly developed technologies, or are capable of generating universally appealing ideas. Such shifts in power-balance tend to produce destabilizing outcomes, thus we can assume the rise in number of non-traditional conflicts.

Globalization will provide international actors with additional tools for enhancing their interests. By making the world more interdependent, it maximizes the chances of every opinion to be heard. It also includes dangerous or destructive opinions, like extremist ideologies for example. That will open up a very important ideological battle in the world of politics. Ideological (and in some cases religious) dimensions could be added to ongoing or new international conflicts.

Last but not least, globalization will reinforce long-term structural changes in the international system. By eroding Westphalian principles, it will transform the very key concepts we used to apply to the realm of international politics. "Poles" of the international system, once associated solely with states, are becoming more abstract. From now on they may also include social movements, value systems, civilizations or terrorist networks. Consequently, simple structural arrangements of the international system (like "bipolar" or "multipolar") will no longer apply in their typical meaning. The international structure will become a more complicated notion, describing the whole set of politically significant units at the global level. Instead of reflecting great powers' constellation, polarity will have to concentrate on alternative poles as well.

The most dangerous structural impact globalization may have upon global security is conserving and deepening inequality. In this case, globalization itself will resemble Westernization, and as such will be perceived as an attempt to impose hegemony upon the international system. If that will be the case, world politics will rapidly become antagonistic to such an extent that any compromised solutions will be hard to achieve. Under these circumstances, efficiency of most international organizations and regimes will fall, which will lead to a deep crisis of stability-enhancing mechanisms.

Globalization will produce both material and non-material outcomes for global security. The former will affect balance of power and global distribution of economic and military capabilities. Here, key concepts within political realism continue to apply: shifts in power distribution will result in the growing probability of conflicts. However, at the same time, globalization provides new tools for solving them peacefully.

Transformations in non-material contexts of international politics are harder to recognize. They will take the form of identity construction and changes in the meaning of key political concepts. A Global Ethic Project, aimed at establishing a set of common values and ethical standards to be shared by various cultures and faiths, the so-called "ethic of humanity", is one of the exemplifications of globalization in terms of ideas. It creates a broader globalized context of power politics, which hopefully will make it more cooperative and help reduce violence.

Conclusion

The speed and the depth of today's globalization pose an absolutely new challenge for global security. Without being a purely political process, globalization nonetheless rapidly and significantly transforms the political foundations of the world order.

The state, as a primary international actor, finds itself surrounded by competitors ready to offer alternative rules and norms for world politics. Its monopoly in international affairs is over; interstate relations are turning into transnational. These transformations are captured by the notion of a growing interdependence of the various international actors, and this growing interdependence is reinforced by globalization.

Globalization speeds-up political processes and makes virtually everybody sensitive to their outcomes. By accelerating communication, information flows, technology development and exchange, globalization creates a new environment for international actors to operate within. That both requires adaptation of security mechanisms and provokes violent reaction from those who can't keep the pace. Under conditions of interdependence, security is better enhanced through international organizations and regimes; while protests against globalization may take the form of asymmetric threats.

Assessments of globalization vary mainly along two lines of argument. First, it is believed to be either a structural or a contextual change. The

former means that globalization transforms the structure of international politics by introducing material changes into distribution of power. The latter assumes that only changes in context take place. Secondly, globalization is viewed as either enhancing cooperation by making absolute gains more attractive or leading to structural violence via deepening inequalities in economic and social development globally. These assessments are difficult to verify and they continue to shape theoretical debates about the political impact of globalization.

Finally, globalization could be perceived in different ways. It can either be viewed as an imposition of unified norms, predominantly Western, upon the rest of the world, or as a creation of a truly global context for world politics, in which the multitude of cultural traditions are taken into account. In both cases, one can observe how globalization transforms the ways we used to think of anarchy, power, security, war and peace.

Existing theories of globalization pay little attention to specific problems of international security. On the other hand, theories of international relations are not very attentive to globalization, providing only general, paradigmatic overviews of the phenomenon. This study aims at filling the gap and providing a general, theoretical understanding of how globalization transforms international security arrangements.

This is mainly done by providing a new context for international political interactions, enhancing structural violence and facilitating various transnational processes. Summed up, these developments increase incentives for long-term cooperation, but at the same time multiply short-term risks and produce inequality of opportunities, leading to asymmetric threats.

More specific ways in which globalization transforms international conflicts of certain types are of great interest and could be subjects for further research. Globalization may enhance asymmetry, but does it provide additional tools for managing asymmetric conflicts through interdependence mechanisms? Is globalization of ideas a pacifying factor for international relations (or more broadly, are homogenous international systems less prone to wars?) Does globalization help to prevent conflicts of identity or does it make them more likely? These questions tie globalization to international security and they are still to be answered.

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