CHA(LLE)NGE
The legacy of state socialism in Hungary: A discourse analysis

Marta B. Erdos
University of Pecs

Abstract
This article explores social constructions on change. The article begins with a theoretical review on change, focusing mainly on the theories that connect personal and communal domains. Political reality is organized by the discursive practices of the political actors and institutions. Discourse is a mode of political existence that expresses and shapes individuals' and groups' opportunities in life. Learned helplessness and double bind situations are a devastating legacy of the "soft dictatorship" of the communist regime in Hungary in the life-world of the individuals. Parallel to ongoing structural transformations, cultural-discursive reconstruction could promote economic and social development and improve the psychosocial well-being of people. The issue of transition is examined by identifying major turning points in the left-wing rhetoric dominating Hungary's political life for more than sixty years.

Keywords: transition, critical discourse analysis, community, cultural-discursive reconstruction

Introduction
Eastern European countries belonging to the former Soviet block have recently undergone major transformations. The current article proposes a theoretical analysis on the concept of change by addressing the dynamics of political systems. A systemic perspective transgressing disciplinary boundaries is also discussed, together with cultural anthropological and social psychological notions on transformation. What are the conditions, patterns and processes of substantial transformations? How are major changes experienced by the people living in the given society? Before the third wave of democratization, Hungary was perceived as a lucky representative of "goulash communism". What were the possible advantages and disadvantages of this specific position? To answer these questions, a critical discourse analysis is conducted on the left-wing rhetoric that largely determined Hungarian political discourse in the past sixty years.

The political dynamics

Political stability is a result of social consensus on the fundamentals of the given system and on the possible means of conflict resolution. Deligitimatization may occur due to crisis situations, permanent group interest violations and government inefficiency. Major factors contributing to the change of the social system are a marked shift in economic and social power relations, a sudden change in social groups or in social mobility, wars, economic and political pressure, and aspirations or failures of the political elite (Bayer, 1997). A basic form of systemic transformations is revolution, with the purpose of restoring social justice and establishing new legitimacy in the existing political vacuum. Revolutions entail radical structural and institutional transformations and may be followed by a restoration period with detrimental long-term consequences such as the October Revolution in Russia. Reforms are aimed at the fine tuning of the existing system or at redressing serious wrongs but political legitimacy is sustained in the entire process.

According to Huntington (1991) three different types of transition characterized the third wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe: transformation, replacement, and transplacement. Transformation is an elite-controlled change in which reformers of the authoritarian regime take a leading role in the hope that the reforms will help sustain their power. Replacement is a collapse of the former regime where democratization processes are controlled by the opposition. Transplacement is the result of continual negotiations between the reformers and the moderates in the opposition on the reform of regime and government. Economic transition to market economy and a redistribution of property as well as the establishment of certain democratic institutions represented a radical change in the lives of these countries.

The cultural factors

After the era of cold war cultural identity gained more significance in the lives of people. The most acute and threatening conflicts arise among the groups belonging to different civilizations (Huntington, 2003). Culture can be conceived as a symbolic map for human action (Peterson, 1979). Cultural conventions based on our common experiences govern our expectations on chances and choices; the challenges one can meet and the potentials one can identify in processes of change in life. A co-constructed system of shared meanings, expressed in various discourses and embedded into a wide variety of social situations helps one navigate in common directions. People employ "symbolic means both for making sense of what happens and for

managing their interactions with others" (Zittoun et al., 2003, 415.). The symbolic domain is social by definition: a symbol is a type of sign to be interpreted, one that is based on shared and negotiable conventions (Peirce, 2005). Discontinuities in our experience urge us to reconstruct previous patterns using the available symbolic resources. (Zittoun et al., 2003)

Our language, a sophisticated symbolic system opens a potential space for change by facilitating the communal construction of possible worlds (Bruner, 1986). In 20th century philosophy, there has been a radical shift from conceiving language as a reflection on social reality to the idea that our social reality is co-constructed and organized by our language. Political reality is organized by the discursive practices of the political actors and institutions. Discourse is a mode of political existence; it expresses and shapes individuals' and groups' opportunities in life. Political discourse analysis deconstructs "evident" generalizations, and explores potentialities within the discourse (Szabo, 2003). Discourse is self-referential: speakers create their positions and establish the conditions of meanings; in addition, discourse is inseparable from the contemporary historical context. The potentials of discourse on change were also emphasized by Foucault (1996) who asserted that discourse consolidates existing power relations; but simultaneously undermines them by establishing small niches as alternative cultures of tolerance. Symbolic resources provide us with temporary definitions that can be further negotiated in a dialogic process. The symbolic domain is not one without constraints: first, we must adapt our conventions to the reality of the physical environment. Second, the pace of social change should allow culture members' successful adaptation (Zittoun et al., 2003).

In open societies, innovative potentials of change are highly appreciated as a necessary precondition for human development. However, fundamental change involves the destruction of previous patterns in human co-operation and the related personal constructs of the individual, demanding one's adaptation to a new, previously unknown situation (Cooperrider & Whitney, 1999). The notion of catastrophic evolution may explain for people's controversial attitudes to change. Contact will increase diversity and, as a means of cultural evolution, serve as an invaluable resource for successful adaptation. However, there are marked dangers inherent in sudden contact that often impose a mortal threat on the recipients. Sudden contact will radically transform the symbolic structure of human communities: boundaries, values, reference groups, discourse patterns and even entire language systems will change. With globalization, sudden

contact has become part of our everyday lives (Moghaddam, 2006). Frequented linguistic pathways that speakers most often tread on may serve as a kind of protecting belt against the dangers of sudden contact: discursive preferences serve as means of social conservation. Different communities living in the same country have their own alternative conventions (Heracleous, 2001). Comparing dominant[47] cultural patterns (Marshall, 1998) to those of foreign or alternative cultures could enrich our reflective potentials and promote our understanding on the nature of change.

A systemic perspective
We often use the language of our direct sensations to represent notions that we can not directly grasp (e.g. time, value, change etc.) (Lakoff, 1993). Change is generally understood as motion. In this Newtonian perspective, crisis states seem to obey the laws of gravitation when moving downwards into the domain of chaos and evil forces is perceived as an effortless and rapid movement, governed by external forces beyond our control; whereas moving upwards into the domain of good (cosmic) things is seen as a most trying endeavour. To create or reconstruct order from disordered states seems more difficult as we perceive a large number of states as disorder and there are only a few privileged states that are recognized as order (Bateson, 1972). The gravitation metaphor is also reflected in the deficit language of political life and is widespread in the language of social professions (e.g. focusing on anti-discriminatory practices instead of fair treatment; harm-reduction instead of sobriety, risk management instead of ecological responsibility etc.). By supporting the societal dynamics of fear, "human deficit vocabularies are the opiates of the masses" (Cooperrider, Whitney 1999, 23.). Human systems are open and dynamic systems involved in constructing, maintaining and reconstructing their own order. In such systems constructive processes are characterized by a strong synergy. Minimal intervention in the initial conditions may result substantial transformations in a system (McNamee & Gergen, 1999). Disordered, chaotic or regressive states are very salient but are relatively rare as compared to the occurrence of ordered states. Social order is never final, perfect or absolute, but is constantly subject to change; therefore it is subject to (partial) destruction and reconstruction.

---

[47] Modern societies are a conglomeration of competing cultures and subcultures. A dominant culture, through economic or political power, imposes its values, language, customs etc. on the subordinate cultures. The mass media has a major role in this process. (Marshall, 1998)

A systemic theory on change beyond disciplinary boundaries has been developed by Paul Watzlawick and his associates who have posited change as a result of human problem-solving efforts and activities. They have identified two distinct levels of transformations. First-order change is a simple reaction to the problem situation that does not always contribute to finding the solution; rather, it may result in escalating difficulties. In such cases a new perspective is needed, one that renders systemic or second-order change viable. Second-order change involves reflection and reframing; making use of ambiguities and paradoxes inherent in the situation (Watzlawick, Weakland & Fish, 1974). Second-order or systemic change is the exploration of possible worlds by deconstructing the previous symbolic-discursive order. The idea is rooted in Gregory Bateson's theory on communicative learning. According to Bateson, all ecosystems are information systems that are characterized by a specific order. Therefore change is a form of learning where access to the given level is determined by the complexity and the needs of the system. Various levels/aspects of learning may simultaneously be present in an event. More complex levels of learning serve as the contexts for simpler levels. Complex levels may be less adaptive and are more costly from an evolutionary point of view; it is always the actual problem that determines the eligibility of the given level.

In this systemic-relational conception on change, zero learning is a simple reception of information from the environment. Learning I is the context for zero learning facilitating quick recognition of the situation within a limited set of alternatives. Learning I demands recurring contexts and context markers that enable the organism to identify the situation and act accordingly. Learning I is about accountability and stability. Under normal circumstances, these are probably the most important gifts for any species condemned to cooperation in order to survive. This is why patterns of Learning I are highly resistant to change. However, there are instances when Learning II, called deutero-learning by Bateson, is inevitable. It changes the speed, effectiveness, methods or perspectives of Learning I. Deutero-learning is about transferring knowledge among various contexts. Bateson himself has termed this creative stance a transcontextual capacity. When previous ways of development are unsustainable and social-relational patterns are inconsistent or destructive, deutero-learning is required to change the non-adaptive patterns of Learning I. Learning II. involves reflection on own activities and available contexts. Learning III is the context of learning II: a revolutionary change in the entire system of the sets of alternatives. Learning 0 and Learning I help us to consolidate our meanings, conserve the previous order and maintain stability whereas

Learning II and III are important means of cultural evolution and are triggered by sudden contact or internal inconsistencies, such as double bind relational patterns. In this perspective, authoritarian regimes are systems where all the information is under strict control[48]. No new information is allowed to spread in the system, not to mention new modes (frameworks) of information processing as with Learning II and III. This is incompatible with modernization processes as keeping up with constant technological development is rendered impossible by eliminating new knowledge.

Double bind is a habitual practice occurring among two or more parties and forms one's long-term expectations on relational contexts. In a double bind situation one's (physical and/or psychological) survival is at stake. An instruction, received from an authority, is simultaneously denied on a more abstract level (e.g. "Do not take it as punishment"). Escape is made impossible. When Learning II has been completed and "learned helplessness" attitudes have been formed, no external threat is needed any more. Double bind relations may result in destructive forms of behaviour such as suicide or addictions. Smith (2002) pointed out to the fact that double bind relations were predominant in previous systems of totalitarian regimes in which certain social actions were simultaneously required and sanctioned; action was urgently needed and, at the same time, was not viable. There were no explicit rules to be derived and follow. For those living in a totalitarian regime, the world of permanent paradoxes soon became the paramount reality. Double bind relations do not only solicit direct self-destruction; but the construction of false selves or a visionless approach to life is another possible consequence.

According to Buda (1994), Hungarians tend to build a complaining culture: they speak about problems instead of solutions, barriers instead of opportunities and hopeless situations instead of challenges. The theory of learned helplessness (Abramson et al., 1980) is another perspective to understand the "depressed" worldview. Learned helplessness is an important adaptation mechanism preventing the fatal waste of energies in contexts that involve a continuous, inescapable threat. Learned helplessness equals to results of Learning II in the Batesonian view and has a tendency to prevail. People living in a dictatorship had to hide their talents and restrict their own developmental potentials to survive. Anything above the average was considered a menace to the system. In

---

[48] An example is the showcase trial where all the answers are known in advance.

such a context, vindicating the loser's position might have seemed safe and advantageous. Hunyady (2002) gives a comprehensive social psychological analysis on mechanisms of counter-selection, a common practice of communist societies that were introduced to encourage "social mobility", the rising of reliable party members and the decline of those "others"[49] who were competent but were considered a threat to the prevailing ideology. Due to the obscurity of regulations, reflected in blurred meanings, self-induced censorship curbed professional performance.

Communitas, change, and visions

Patterns of cultural evolution and conservation are co-constructed and reflected in community practices. The folklorist Van Gennep has examined a number of different cultures and has found a relatively stable pattern in major transformations of states and roles mediating between the person and the community. He termed these social practices "rites of passages" and identified three subsequent phases. In the beginning, one is separated from his previous tasks, roles and social relations. This is conceived as a significant loss, the first and displeasing consequence of developmental needs. In the next phase, termed "liminal" by Van Gennep from the Latin word "limen"(threshold), the person is an in-between, isolated state where previous personal constructs are not workable any more but new meanings and organizing principles are not yet accessible either. The torments of this in-between transitional phase mostly come from the temporary social isolation and anticipated risks of permanent marginalization. The third phase is that of reincorporation: one is reintegrated into the community with one's new states, roles and identity (Van Gennep, 1960). Following the contributions of Victor Turner (1997; 1982) the theory proved very influential in the social sciences and in the humanities. Turner, referring to modernity, introduced the new concept of "liminoid" where the person, a member of individualized western societies, is included in a less predictable setting with fewer constraints and more choices. However, in such a setting the availability of community support seems rather arbitrary throughout the process. Turner also elaborated on the notion of communitas, a community experience in the liminal phase of the process of transition where core values and visions of the given culture can manifest themselves. A typical example of communitas is the first phase of revolutions when notions of liberty, fraternity and equality are manifested.

---

[49]An administrative category referring to one's family background, religious affiliations, private entrepreneurship status etc. that was used even in the 1980's. "Others" were deprived of equal chances in education and work.

Social structures and communitas together constitute the entirety of "societas", our society. Overwhelming predominance of one over the other will result stagnation or chaos in the lives of societies and the people (Turner, 1997).

The Hungarian cultural-historical context of change
The late modern social environment
Globalization processes have had a great impact on Hungary in recent decades, especially in the years after the accession to the European Union. Hankiss (2007), a Hungarian sociologist underscores that the Soviet dependency system caused considerable economic damage and yielded little benefit. The western sphere of interests is far more efficient and offers greater opportunities, but power relations are more complex and competition is more acute. Identifying challenges, making decisions and representing Hungary's interest was a mortal risk in the previous totalitarian system and is a must in the present context.

Deepening problems of late modern consumer societies significantly affect countries of the former Soviet block. Positive views on change were substantially challenged by the concept of risk society (Beck, 1992). Disillusionment about industrial-technological developments that had been meant to solve all the health and social problems of humankind brought about lasting anxiety and ressentiment. The grave disappointment is accompanied by sceptical and helpless positions due to fears from "loss of control" in the societies that tend to fetishize control and predictability during processes of change (Deetz, 1992). Uneasy sensations are manifested in the environmental-ecological metaphors of self-destruction. Living in an age of uncertainty creates positions for the culture bearers to form and maintain stereotypes and prejudices against alien cultural concepts and persons (Bauman, 2007), a delimiting form of defence against sudden contact. In the era of the Great Disruption social capital is on the decrease in the western societies. Social transformations include processes as the disintegration of local communities, devastating extremities of individualism, ambiguities in values, new and penetrating forms of aggression and the impairment of social solidarity (Fukuyama, 2000).

When processes of human co-operation are unpredictable and trust in one's fellows is lost, positive and constructive vision of the future is missing and people develop negative attitudes to change. In contemporary late modern environment individuals tend to focus on their present experiences. Consumerism provides the individual with marketable commodity

identities and human creativity is exchanged for mass production and consumption (Kelemen & B. Erdos, 2004). In financial terms, consumer societies may have profited from the extremities of the carpe diem, hedonistic world-view that encourages large scale consumption. The painful lesson, formulated as early as in the 1970's by Bateson (1972) that our welfare and well-being do not solely depend on the enlightened rationalism of technical-economic development, is still to be learnt shortly after the 2008 global crisis. This experience was unexpected for the people living in the lasting seclusion of a communist dictatorship.

A historical-discursive perspective on the 1989 transition in Hungary

The 1989 transition is not univocally interpreted as a success story in Hungary; neither as a result of a plausible compromise between the former opposition and reform communists. Hankiss, a Hungarian sociologist (2007) summarizes one "failure" interpretation as follows:

> ....the majority of people who found themselves in positions of power in 1989 or became dominant shortly afterwards did not choose the path of creating a welfare state. Instead they exposed the country to international economic and financial forces in the name of a neo-conservative, neo-liberal ideology and in this way deprived the country of any and all means of self-defense. As beneficiaries of this process, they contributed to the country's re-colonization.

Others argue that "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose"; transition was nothing but a successful political manoeuvre to preserve power relations and allow the previous political elite to follow a get-rich-quick scheme. Privatizations have provided former party members with abundant resources of economic capital (Hankiss, 2007). Politicians have failed to pay attention to issues of social justice, an important factor in legitimizing power relations and making the people adhere to the decisions (Mikula, 1999).

In the subsequent part of the article, the results of a discourse analysis are presented to outline the nature of the political powers that dominated Hungary's recent history. Is there continuity in the political rhetoric of the Hungarian Workers' Party / Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party /

Hungarian Socialist Party[50]? How the milestones of political change are constructed in political leaders' discourse?

Discursive positions as our cultural conventions on change are established in our understandings of history as teacher of life. To identify these positions, a brief summary on Hungary's history is presented. Hungary's geopolitical position is a key to understanding its history: this position soon made the country a transit zone between East and West, a shield protecting Western Europe from Eastern conquerors. Thual (1997) termed this position a forced victimized identity situation. For the last five centuries, the Hungarian people fought for their national independence against foreign invaders, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs and the Soviets. The Habsburgs followed the policy of divide and conquer what proved most effective in sustaining and strengthening their power. The dynasty fuelled hostility among all the ethnic groups living in the Carpathian Basin. Hungary, as a "natural ally" fought on the side of Austria, its former enemy during World War I. As a result, two thirds of its territory was annexed to several neighbouring countries in the Trianon Treaty. The Hungarians living in these territories became the largest groups of national minority in Central Europe (Molnar, 2010). The treaties concluding World War I. had a deep, demoralizing impact on Europe. (Bateson, 1972) Hungary's participation in World War II, where major political groups were allied to the Nazis in the hope that the lost territories would be returned, may be understood as an indirect consequence of the treaty. Fascist ideology, though it was not univocally supported, could dominate Hungary's political life until 1945. The subsequent Soviet invasion brought about the continuation of terror, insecurity, and the lasting economic exploitation of the country (Singer, 2010).[51]

---

[50]The Hungarian Workers' Party, a communist party between 1948-1956, was transformed into the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in 1957. After the transition, its name was changed to Hungarian Socialist Party.

[51] German and Hungarian victims of malenki robot („little work") were taken to work camps to the Soviet Union, following the principle of collective guilt, the very same principle that was applied in the Nazi death camps. Many of them died, others suffered severe health impairments and were sentenced to more than 40 years of silence, fear, guilt and shame. There were children and elderly people among them. They were deprived of their identities and none of them knew how long their „punishment" would take. People living in the Soviet dependency system had to accept that these groups were guilty. According to the Decision of the European Court (2008) in the case of prohibition on the use of red star, prohibition is a violation of „freedom of expression" (www.politics.hu/20080709/european-court-overturns-hungarian-prohibition-on-communist-star, 21st October, 2008) although several million people were killed in Stalin's camps.

Social practices of remembering from a Hungarian perspective were prohibited during the Soviet occupation. Cultural memories that could have been maintained by rites, ceremonies, monuments and commemorations were sentenced to be forgotten. Personal channels of communicative memory were also blocked by people's fears.[52] They were deprived of their personally experienced historical past, an important aspect of their own identities. Communists, by reductio ad Hitlerum, identified any endeavour to reconstruct national identity, e.g., celebrating national holidays[53] or using historical object-symbols as a menace to their totalitarian rule and a threatening manifestation of "fascism"[54]. Communists, although looked upon themselves as materialists believing only in the "hard facts" of life and conceived culture a mere superstructure determined by economic factors, proved to be firm believers in the power of discourse. Those forming and communicating an alternative opinion on the communist system were severely disciplined. Rakosi, the Prime Minister of Hungary in the 1950's, avatar of Stalin's ideology was represented as the "father" punishing the "sinners" (i.e., non-communists) of the guilt-laden, vicious "past"(Lanyi, 2001; Kapitany & Kapitany, 1993).

Frequent biblical references in the excerpt below, written in 1952 in a newspaper on the life of "Comrade Rakosi" outline the portrait of an almighty political leader, a saint in an eternal and sacred environment created by the Soviets:

---

[52] Parents often chose not to tell their stories to their children in case they would mention these in public and get into trouble together with their families.

[53] According to a popular Hungarian joke, the Soviets ask the Turks how they can be on such good terms with the Hungarians. The answer: "You know we did not make them celebrate the day when they were defeated by us."

[54] A peculiar example of the deep confusion over national identity issues in Hungary is the following: disproportionate police measures were taken against a group of Hungarian soccer fans in early November, 2008 in Slovakia, a neighbouring country where Hungarian national minorities live. A few weeks later the Hungarian police prevented Hungarian soccer fans from taking their own national flag with them when two Hungarian teams were playing in a match of the Hungarian Soccer League Second Division in a Hungarian city, Pecs. Using one's own national flag in one's own native land when two native teams were playing was considered as a menace to public order (and perhaps as an impolite gesture to Slovakia).
http://www.nemzetisport.hu/minden_mas_foci/20081101/szlovakia_magyar_serultek_a_dunaszerdahelyslovan_meccsen/
http://www.kisalfold.hu/belfold_hirek/nem_engedtek_be_a_magyar_zaszlot_a_stadionba/2077997/ 18th January, 2009.

> The Hungarian people affectionately love our leader, teacher, the *first architect of our new life*, Matyas Rakosi, who is dedicated to *fight for the peace and independence of our homeland*…. Comrade Rakosi is Stalin's best Hungarian *disciple*. He is the *high-spirited apostle* of proletarian internationalism, a member of the staff of international revolutionary workers' movement and a forerunner of the *eternal friendship* between the Hungarian and the Soviet people (translation and italics belong to the author)[55]

Distortions in values and social relations were mirrored in the discursive practices of the contemporary society where obscure social rules were accompanied by blurred meanings of certain key words as "problem", "choice", reform", "change", "development" "friend", "peace", community" or "consensus", meaning just the opposite when one tried to navigate through social reality (Terestyeni, 2001). Blurred meanings and frequent use together have constituted a discursive double bind: attempts to reflect on shared social reality have been paralyzed by the unspeakable differences between the lexical meanings and those established by the use of a word. Semantic satiation may be an effective temporary barrier to building a reconstructive social discourse.[56]

A salient example of discursive double bind is "exercising self-criticism", often required by the Soviet leaders. External critique had to be "internalized", and concepts alien to one's own values and interests be readily accepted.

> In the decrees the most important issues of our party and of our people's *democracy* have been addressed. *The mistakes that were manifested in the work of our party and in the economic sector of our people's democracy were discussed in details*…. Our Party, the Hungarian Workers' Party has been most successful since the *liberation* of Hungary.
> …. *most importantly, the living standards of people, of both the workers and the peasants have reached a level that can not be compared to that of the Horthy-era…. We have accomplished these results because our liberator and friend, the mighty Soviet Union supported us…. Our Central Committee, however, has stated that our party and especially the party leaders made serious mistakes during their work.*
> The Assembly of the Central Committee has worked out the *rules* that ensure collective leadership and *party democracy* in the future, as an inevitable pledge for healthy development, and *enforce communist criticism*

---

[55] Kiss, Karoly in Szabad Nép, 24th February, 1952. p. 3.

[56] In an appropriate moment, the very same vagueness and ambiguity may serve as a symbolic resource for second order change as the discourse built on paradoxes can always be debated and can be maintained only at a high cost by external pressure.

and self-criticism. We have to make sure that party democracy, healthy criticism and
self-criticism gain grounds in the whole party …
We have to confess that *in the fever of creative work* we have made serious
mistakes…we have overestimated economic resources and neglected the
constraints of reality.… The *enemy* is also aware of all these; and this is why
they are making attempts to obstruct our measures.… We have to be
determined in our fight against the *demagogue* attempts of the enemy…
(translation and italics belong to the author).[57]

In the above excerpt, cornerstones of the contemporary communist
discourse are manifested: unconditional devotion to the Party, self-
criticism, "the fever of creative work" as an excuse for making the mistakes
and exceeding the limits of economic and social reality, establishing an
"angry for you, not with you attitude[58]", a special inversion and projection
of own faults (as with "demagogue attempts") and an image of a powerful
and ever-vigilant enemy.

Anyone resisting the single, univocal communist "truth" was prosecuted:
killed or imprisoned, deprived of personal belongings, workplace, shelter,
friends and relatives. Social solidarity and citizen initiations were extinct.
In the frozen communist structure a number of hollow ceremonies were
employed to control people and exclude the immense renewing power of
communitas from the life of the Hungarian society. Internal legitimacy was
weak; there was no myth behind the rituals; still, people had to adore the
naked king who had enough weapons to eliminate any ideas of
independence. The trauma of the 1956 revolution became another silenced
story in Hungary's history and the political pressure to report on one
another extinguished trust among people.

Kadar, Rakosi's successor could embody all the fears, surrender and
victimized position of "ordinary people". His speech delivered shortly after
the defeat of the 1956 revolution, though it fit nicely into the rhetorical
traditions of Rakosi and to the expectations of the Soviets, can also be read
as an early expression of the new policy of reconciliation summarized as
"he who is not against us is with us."

Workers, comrades and Budapest workers,

---

[57] Rákosi's speech delivered on 1st July, 1953 at the Assembly of the Hungarian Workers'
Party. mek.niif.hu/01900/01937/html/szerviz/dokument/rakosis0.htm, 14th May, 2010.
[58] From a poem written by Attila Jozsef (1905-1937), a Hungarian poet

What makes today's 1st of May so significant for our people, and also internationally? On this day, the Hungarian working people are free to celebrate the historic victory of proletarian internationalism, *a victory over the October counter-revolution* with the *international help* of the proletariat. On this *celebration* we announce – and *let our words be heard by friends and enemies – that our people will heal the wounds caused by the counter-revolution.*[59]

This is not a free speech – Kadar read it out in a firm, almost menacing voice. Opposite meanings (victory, help) are also present in the speech but a (probably not deliberate) example of transcontextual creativity is included in the text: friends and enemies occur in one sentence and in the same syntactical position. The mismatch between syntax (identical) and semantics (opposite) may have different readings depending on whether we take contemporary (imprisonments and executions) or subsequent (soft dictatorship) events into consideration. Also, people living in the Rakosi-era had the common experience that a showcase trial may quickly turn a friend into an enemy.

Kadar was a man of compromise turning predominant black and white thinking into dull, nevertheless safe and predictable grey. Trying to balance between the Hungarian people's longing for the forbidden West and the ligatures of the Soviets as reality, he introduced certain improvements to make Hungary resemble more western welfare states. Blurred meanings served the purpose of a weird "synthesis" between democracy and the authoritarian system of state socialism:

No-one is prosecuted for one's political views in Hungary but anyone committing a crime that is *illegal, political and is against the system* will be severely punished." Further: "In Hungary, there is *no censorship, there has never been censorship, but provocation against the system by using the press is violative of law and is punished* (translation and italics belong to the author).[60]

People living in the Kadar-era were introduced into a peculiar version of consumerism. Marx's materialism was re-interpreted for daily use as the accumulation and excessive consumption of available goods. People were more and more encouraged to seize the pleasures of the moment without

---

[59] www.videa.hu/videok/hirek-politika/kadar-beszede-57-majus-1-majalis-mszmp-MhmriVtyUzyJNmeE

[60] **Janos Kadar on the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the party. (The speech was held in 1968, the year when the Prague Spring democratization attempts were halted by the Warsaw Pact intervention.) Janos Kadar: 1975. Válogatott beszédek és cikkek 1957-1974. (Selected speeches and articles) Budapest: Kossuth.**

any concern for the future, which was the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party's responsibility. As a result, Hungary ran into debts. This policy has continued after the transition and is a considerable burden on the subsequent generations.

Generally, communist countries were deprived of communication interactions and mutually advantageous economic relations with the majority of other countries, although Hungary seemed to have been in a privileged position as the "happiest barrack in the Soviet camp". Strictly controlled business trips, organized tours abroad and black market connections formed a peculiar link between Hungary and the western world (Frost & Frost, 2000). However, the image of the western welfare states was more fantasy driven than reality. The short term-encounters did not allow the Hungarians to form an elaborate opinion. As an adverse impact of the Soviet propaganda, idealization of the western countries was rather common. Due to this stance, prospects on EU integration were a major pull-factor in the 1989 transition. However, the fantasy-driven image could not protect the Hungarian people against the danger of sudden contact; rather, it resulted in an increased vulnerability to global-level consumerism.[61]

Contemporary statistical data suggest that living in the happiest barrack was not as happy: in the years preceding the transition the Hungarian statistical figures on self-destruction used to be the highest in the world. Problem drinking affected one tenth of the Hungarian population and the rate of completed suicides was the highest known in the world, 45/100.000 in 1987 (Zonda & Veres, 2004). Deviances were a puzzling problem for the communist party as the system announced itself a society free from exploitation and, consequently, free from all sorts of social and mental problems. Instead, the Hungarian society was practically atomized; autonomous communities were extinct. People lived in "socialistic" quasi communities which did not help the articulation of interests and reconstruction of personal identities (Hankiss, 1983). The system proved unsustainable. State debts, structural problems of the national economy, major social problems, ideologies alien to state socialism and a new policy

---

[61] In 2008, the highest rate of state support in Europe given to multinational firms was 2.38% of the GDP, in Hungary. These firms could enjoy the benefits of positive discrimination against domestic enterprises in a dual economic system. www.mno.hu/portal/685084. 13th May, 2010.

of the Soviets represented in the catchwords of glasnost and perestroika were the major factors that all contributed to the erosion of state socialism.

In 1985, Kadar, a self-confident and popular political leader declared that "A decisive and basic feature of the Hungarian society is that this is a socialist country and a socialist society. Exploitation of people by other people ceased to exist.… Due to Hungary's historical development there is a single-party system and there will be a single-party system."[62]

Kadar's last public speech was made on 12th April, 1989 at the Assembly of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. In this speech Kadar is very personal, perhaps due to his mental condition and to the pressing situation that he identified as an impeachment. Kadar was tormented by guilt and doubts and could find an escape in his poor physical condition. Nevertheless he clearly wanted to make a confession. Statements of repentance, even in the form of "self-criticism", however, were considered a danger to the sustainment of legitimacy during the transition and were soon eliminated from contemporary political discourse.

> When I made the declaration I termed it (the 1956 revolution – the author) *a peaceful student demonstration, an uprising, and I did not label it a counter-revolution*. I referred this way to the participants and the processes as well – *nobody could understand why I spoke the way I did*. Cause I have finally realized that from 28th October, 1956 on, armless people were randomly selected, perhaps because of *the clothes they wore, or of the colour of their skin, and were killed in a pogrom*. They had been killed before Imre Nagy and his followers were executed. *If I don't take a historical perspective I can tell you that now, after 30 years, I am sorry for everyone*. (translation and italics belong to the author)[63]

In the above excerpt reflecting Kadar's ambivalence and guilt an official view is raised that is recurrent in post-transitional political discourse. In this rhetoric, playing the Nazi card, the 1956 revolution is a counter revolution led by reactionist forces. Gyula Horn[64], Hungary's Prime Minister between 1994-1998, was member of the Steppenjackenbrigade defending the communist rule in 1956. According to him, some vicious criminals were let out of prison and endangered public safety. When his active role in the defeat of the revolution was revealed he was asked to

---

[62] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwevIvPBoSQ 13th May, 2010

[63]Hungarian transcription by Mihaly Kornis. www.kornismihaly.hu/a_kadar_beszed.pdf. 14th May, 2010.

[64]www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/orszagos_lista/mszp/horn_gyula/horn_gyula_cikkek. 14th May, 2010.; http://www.mno.hu/portal/420987. 9th June, 2010.

resign his post but he commented "So what?" and stayed, learning the rules of a newborn democracy where the system of recall did not exist.

Peter Medgyessy, Prime Minister between 2002 and 2004, was perceived as a dedicated follower of Kadar's welfare policy. In his electoral campaign in 2002 he emphasized social reforms and promised a strong welfare policy. The government's discourse addressed ordinary people "daring to be small" who were still cherishing sweet memories of the Kadar-system. This catchword, reflecting the safety of learned helplessness attitudes, counter-selection and self-censorship markedly differentiated him from Viktor Orban[65], the opposition's leading politician. Three weeks after Medgyessy's inauguration a Hungarian journal published a document proving that Peter Medgyessy used to be an agent[66]of the secret police in the late 1970's. He was accused of regularly reporting on his colleagues to the Soviet Union. The script was same as with Gyula Horn: the opposition tried to press him to resign what he refused to do.

In spite of the enormous costs of Medgyessy's campaign promises, the Hungarian Socialist Party lost the 2004 elections to the European Parliament. The Hungarian Socialist Party as governing party elected the Minister of Sports, Ferenc Gyurcsany[67] for the new Prime Minister. He, a former board member of the Committee of the Communist Youth Association, belonged to the second generation of the Hungarian Socialist Party. After the transition he turned a most prosperous businessman and became one among the richest 100 people in Hungary. In 2002 he was appointed chief consultant to Peter Medgyessy. Soon he became Minister of Youth and Sports. In 2006 he won the elections against Viktor Orban and in 2007 he became President of the Hungarian Socialist Party.

The immense defeat of the Hungarian Socialist Party in the 2010 general elections may be due to the 2008 global crisis and a sudden shift in party rhetoric in 2006. An audiotape of a private party speech, in which Gyurcsany admitted that his party had lied to the public in order to win the general election[68], was made public by an anonymous HSP-member or group. Gyurcsany's previous announcements on the necessity of "reforms" (i.e., restrictions) followed the usual political rhetoric of the Kadar-era,

---

[65]http://www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/pest_megye/pest_megye_teruleti_lista/dr_orban_viktor/eletrajz . 9th June, 2010.

[66] http://mn.www2.mno.hu/portal/88923. 9th June, 2010

[67]http://www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/orszagos_lista/mszp/gyurcsany_ferenc. 9th June, 2010.

[68] news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm (18th July, 2008)

summarized so aptly by Hankiss (2007): "Don't worry, it's going to be all right, just trust us…There might be a couple of not so very good years and we might have to pull our belts a little bit tighter, but it won't really hurt; just keep quiet and be good…"

Strong language was one salient feature of the 2006 speech. It is more important, though, that the links that had been established with the previous system of state socialism and had ensured broad social consensus were irreversibly torn. It seems a paradox but it was actually Gyurcsany's speech and not the opposition's critiques that made it clear for the public that the Kadar-type state socialism came to its end:

> There is not much choice. There is not, because we have screwed up. Not a little but a lot. No country in Europe has screwed up as much as we have….We have obviously lied throughout the past 18 to 24 months. It was perfectly clear that what we were saying was not true. We are beyond the country's possibilities to such an extent that we could not conceive earlier that a joint government of the Socialists and the liberals would ever do. And in the meantime we did not actually do anything for four years. Nothing.
> Naturally, the government's work is not constructed nicely, calmly or scrupulously. No. No. It is being prepared at a mad break-neck speed because we could not do it for a while in case it came to light, and now we have to do it so desperately that we are almost at the breaking point. And then we end up falling over because we cannot keep up the pace.
> Divine providence, the abundance of cash in the world economy, and hundreds of tricks, which you do not have to be aware of publicly, have helped us to survive this. Reform or failure. There is nothing else. And when I say failure, I am talking about Hungary, the left wing, and I very honestly tell, you, about myself, too...
> I will only repeat this once at most: it is fantastic to be in politics. Fantastic. It is fantastic to run a country. Personally, I have been able to go through the past 18 months because one thing has inspired and fuelled me: to give back its faith to the left, that it can do it and it can win. That the left does not have to lower its head in this bloody country. That it does not have to shit its pants from Viktor Orban or the right, and it should learn to measure itself against the world, rather than them.… This gave me the faith that it is worth doing this. It was a great thing. I loved it. It was the best part of my life. Now the faith comes from the fact that I am creating history. Instead, we lied morning, noon and night. I do not want to carry on with this. (…) I will never hurt the Hungarian left. Never.

Gyurcsany posited himself as a competent ("tricky") expert and a strong leader. He revealed his personal attitudes by speaking strong language and by raising faith and inspirations as it is required with members of late

modern individualistic cultures where boundaries between public and private spheres are often enmeshed (a celeb politician). In some respects, though, the speech follows the early communist rhetoric of the 1950's. Self-criticism is a main theme: as the speech proceeds, however, inclusive "we" is exchanged for a "reform I" and the others. The stance is the usual "angry for you, not with you". Party interests prevail and the ever-vigilant enemy is looking forward to the failure of the party. The speech, unlike the majority of Kadarian political speeches, clearly determines a turning point in the history of the party.

As a result of the new, open and definitely non-Kadarian rhetoric, the autumn of 2006 brought severe street fights in Hungary. A great number of citizens protested and demanded the resignation of a government that had failed, lied and employed „hundreds of tricks". The government immediately returned to old reflexes and labelled the protests „extreme right manifestations" of a small group of people. What followed seems a step back to totalitarian techniques: some people were brutally beaten by the police[69]. In November, the Chief Constable of Budapest was awarded a medal for the "intensive and innovative methods employed to protect public safety." [70] After a couple of months he was pressed to resign as his innovative methods seemed to undermine leading politicians' fading popularity.

In 2008 in a subsequent speech held at the HSP national assembly Gyurcsany commented the 2006 speech as "essentially, it was truth talk" and interpreted it as a responsible act. He posited himself an efficient politician in control by predicting future changes. He defined the party as his major source of legitimacy, contrasting parliamentary democracy and the "brutal" enemy's populism: "More or less, I am the President of the Hungarian Socialist Party and Prime Minister as long as the Hungarian Socialist Party assumes that they have some business with me."[71] He refused dictatorship as an alternative, but was speaking about "taking the country by the hand and lead it" which reflects a strong paternalistic attitude and constructs an image of a helpless mass of people instead of actively participating citizens of a democratic state.

---

[69] index.hu/politika/belfold/2006/elkurtuk/galeriak/ and www.mno.hu/portal/379917 (9th September, 2008).

[70] „Budapest Award" and „Award for the Public Safety of the Capital" www.rtlhirek.hu/cikk/32173http://index.hu/politika/belfold/gyrcsny1116/ (7th August, 2008).

[71] kapcsolat.hu/blog/itt_a_beszed (14th May, 2010).

Conclusion

Political discourse has been defined as a mode of political existence shaping individuals' and social groups' opportunities in life. When thinking in terms of opportunities, "real change" is the co-construction of a new, more resourceful context, understood as second order change.

In the soft dictatorship of Hungary an elite-controlled transformation took place. The Kadarian system as a "friendly" way of state-socialism was successful in maintaining its broad legitimacy. Its unsustainability was unknown for the wider public, thus the majority of the citizens could identify themselves with several beneficial features of the system (e.g. full employment, a favourable level of social and public safety etc.). The HSP, making use of the vivid nostalgia for the Kadar-regime, has managed to win three of the general elections since the transition. Their political strategy has forced them into a position which rendered economic and social reforms and parallel re-authoring of Hungary's recent history difficult. The "as if" nature of the Kadarian route of developments in the shadow of the Soviets with their centrally planned economy and thinking proved a time bomb that exploded in 2008 when the global crisis confronted the Hungarians with the unsustainability of their nostalgias to the system as well as with some major shortcomings of the transition in 1989.

Hungary seems to be going through a "reality therapy". The Hungarians were expecting a sudden transition into their promised land of welfare societies: as if by pressing the shift button the way of life could be CAPITALIZED and a quick social fix be employed. The transition was successful in establishing some of the democratic institutions and a market-based economy. Hankiss examined a number of interpretations concerning the nature of change; some of these would represent a "yes" and others a definite "no" to our basic question whether the 1989 transition meant fundamental, systemic change, an expansion of opportunities both in the economic sector and in terms of social relations. The results of a discourse analysis presented in this article underline that there are certain turning points in the dominant political rhetoric. Conflicting interpretations and the great number of yes-no alternatives concerning the transition are a concomitant of the process of change that is far from being complete.

In any culture, entering into a land of uncertainty from a well-known social arena will induce ambivalence in the members of the culture and result in

ambiguities in their communal constructions. The arising need to negotiate shared meanings and visions on systemic change are incommensurable with the conservative perspective of a closed society. Political conflicts may have a positive role in any opening society where patterns of learned helplessness and paternalistic attitudes still dominate citizens' cognitions. Conflicting meanings and interpretations are essential in the process of change. Group interests are to be articulated and alternatives are to be measured and compared. Cultural change, an important factor in further economic and social development, is a slow process taking several decades in the lives of the subsequent generations. The first step is probably grief work over both the positive aspects (e.g. predictability and social security) of the past and over the hopes and expectations that have proven vain. The anger expressed in social conflicts and protests may be a sign of this grief work; but it can also be attributed to perceived violations of principles of social justice. Protests and civil disobedience in the contemporary society may successfully fight people's isolation and indifference, may promote the articulation of personal and community identities and lay the foundations of a more democratic discourse as well as contribute to the establishment of certain democratic institutions that are still missing from the system (e.g., the system of recall).

Since 1989, a new generation has been brought up free from the direct experiences of living in a dictatorship. Cultural contacts could be formed and maintained outside the former Soviet block. Internet and other global communication technologies are a rich resource for alternative perspectives. Due to the adverse impact of globalization tendencies, local communities that play an immense role in cultural change are more and more appreciated. After the transition a big community boom has started in Hungary. It is in the local community where people can reconstruct their identity, practice democracy (and understand their responsibilities in doing so) and experience their freedom. One of the most important potentials inherent in these communities is a more balanced dialectic between structure and communitas; between powers of conservation and visions on change. Local communities provide frameworks for citizen collaboration and may contribute to the formation of a positive and tolerant national identity, one that is not built on permanent confrontation but on the recognition of complementary roles and cultural values. In the "unity in diversity" of Europe Hungary may turn from a buffer into a bridge.

The liberation of communicative and cultural memories was initiated by interested scholars, activists, and the mass media, forming a new

perspective on 20th century Central and Eastern European history. Community action has a key role in remembering and restoring victims' faith in a more just world. Those who were maltreated and tortured in the communist era may pass their fears to subsequent generations. Trust can be built only by listening to their stories and making symbolic steps towards restoration. Fair treatment fights social anomie and isolation and it serves as a basis for a mutually negotiated and accepted humane value system.

Examining social change from a broader perspective, the writing on the wall for the 2008 crisis was present for several decades. Ecological conflicts as grand narratives of humankind's self-destruction, the dynamic of fear embodied in the concept of risk society, and the spread of addictions as a caricature of the extremities of consumer society were among the omens for the turn. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore whether the measures that have been introduced to overcome the crisis represent a second order change or they are just a "rearrangement of the deck chairs on the Titanic". Hungary's case may demonstrate that trying to maintain an unsustainable system is very costly in all respects. Citizens' participation in constructive processes of change depends on their ability to create positive visions of the future. "If (…) a community's leaders do recognize that emerging values and rapidly shifting environmental demands call for directly engaging people in change, they often face another challenge. When the fear of uncertainty, the potential for winners and losers and the history of failures define change, how can they systematically involve people and have some confidence that it will work?" (Cooperrider, Whitney, 1999, 3). The acquisition of learned resourcefulness (Rosenbaum, cit. Riikonen, 1999) and the release of creative potentials entail a change of attitudes to change.

Bibliography:

Abramson, Lyn Y., Garber. Judy, Seligman, Martin E. P. 1980. Attributional Analysis of Helplessness. In: Garber, J., Seligman, M. E. P. (eds.) *Human Helplessness. Theory and Applications.* New York: Academic Press, 3-34.

Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology.* Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2007. *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty.* Polity Press.

Bayer, Jozsef. 1997. *A politikatudomány alapjai. (Introduction into political science)* Budapest: Napvilag. 263-282.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage

Bruner, Jerome. 1986. *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. (The Jerusalem-Harvard Lectures)* Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Buda, Bela. 1994. *Mentálhigiéné. A lelki egészség társadalmi, munkaszervezeti, pszichokulturális és gyakorlati vetületei. (On mental health. Social, organizational, psychocultural and practical approaches) Tanulmánygyűjtemény.* Animula: Budapest.

Cooperrider, David L., & Whitney, Diana. 1999. *Appreciative Inquiry.* San Francisco: Berrett-Kochler Communications Inc.

Deetz, Stanley A. 1992. *Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1996. *A szexualitás története. (The History of Sexuality)* Budapest: Atlantisz.

Frost, Kathryn M. & Frost, Christopher J. 2000. Romanian and American Life Aspirations in Relation to Psychological Well-Being. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 6*: 726-751.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2000. *The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.* New York: Touchstone.

Hankiss, Elemer. 2007. *Interpretations of the Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe* www.talaljuk-ki.hu/index.php/article/articleview/932/1/62/. 20.06.2008.

Hankiss, Elemer. 1983. *Társadalmi csapdák. Diagnózisok.* (Social Traps. Diagnoses) Budapest: Magvető.

Heracleous, Loizos. 2001. An Ethnographic Study of Culture in the Context of Organizational Change. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 37*: 426-446.

Huntington, Samuel, P. 1991. *The Third Wave.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 114.

Huntington, Samuel, P. 2003. *A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása. (The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order)* Budapest: Europa.

Hunyady, Gyorgy. 2002. A kontraszelekció pszichológiája: egy kutatási terület feltérképezése. (On the psychology of counter-selection) In: Hunyady, L. (ed.) *Szociálpszichológia történelemtanároknak. Tanulmánygyűjtemény.* Budapest: Okonet. 448-488.

Kapitany, Agnes & Kapitany, Gabor. 1993. *Rejtjelek. (Secret codes).* Budapest: Szoroban.

Kelemen, Gabor & B. Erdos, Marta. 2004. *Craving for Sobriety*. Pecs: Leo AMici 2002 Foundation & University of Pecs

Lakoff, George. 1993. The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. in: Ortony, A.(ed.):*Metaphor and Thought*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 202-252.

Lanyi, Gusztav. 2001. *Rendszerváltozás és politikai pszichológia. (Social transition and political psychology)* Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó.

Marshall, Gordon. 1998. "Dominant culture" in: *A Dictionary of Sociology*. Encyclopedia.com (May 7, 2010) www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1088-dominantculture.html

McNamee, Sheila & Gergen, Kenneth J. 1999. An invitation to Relational Responsibility. In: McNamee, Sheila & Gergen, Kenneth J (eds.) *Relational Responsibility: Resources for Sustainable Dialogue*. London: Sage Publications. 3-18.

Mikula, Gerald. 1999. *Social psychology of social justice*. A review. Keynote address. 5th. Alps-Adria Psychology Conference. Pecs

Moghaddam, Fathali, M. 2006. Catastrophic Evolution, Culture and Diversity Management Policy. *Culture & Psychology 4*. 415-434.

Molnar, Margit. 2010. Majority and "minority" in Transylvania. A legislative perspective *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, under review.

Peirce, Charles S. 2005. A jelek felosztása. (A typology of signs) In: Horányi Ö., Szépe Gy. (eds) *A jel tudománya.* Budapest: General Press. 103-113.

Peterson, Richard. 1979. Revitalizing the culture concept. *Annual Review of Sociology, 5:* 137-166.

Riikonen, Eero. 1999. Inspiring Dialogues and Relational Responsibility. McNamee, S., Gergen, K. (eds.) *Relational Responsibility. Resources for Sustainable Dialogue*. Sage, Thousand Oaks. 139-151.

Szabo, Marton. 2003. *A diszkurzív politikatudomány alapjai. Elméletek és elemzések. (Introduction into discursive political science. Theories and analyses.)* Budapest: L'Harmattan Kiadó.

Singer, Zsuzsa. 2010. A „málenkij robot" a magyarországi német kisebbség történetében és történelmi emlékezetében. (Malenki robot in the history and memory of the Hungarian German national minority.) *Szociális Szemle 3* (1) in press.

Smith, Jeffrey, A. 2002. Suicide in Post-Socialist Countries. Examples from Hungary and Belorus. *Anthropology of East Europe*

Review.http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer20_1.html. 05.06.2007.

Terestyéni, Tamas. 2001. Együttműködés és konfrontáció a közéleti kommunikációban. (Cooperation and confrontation in public communication) In: Buda, B., Sárközi, E.(eds.) *Közéleti kommmunikáció*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. 28-50.

Thual, Francois. 1997. Geopolitika és a magyar identitás. (Geopolitics and Hungarian Identity) *Magyar Szemle*, *7-8.* 77-84.

Turner, Victor, W. 1997. Átmenetek határok, szegénység: a communitas vallási szimbólumai. (Transitions, boundaries, and poverty: the religious symbols of communitas) In: Bohannan, Paul, Glazer, Mark (eds.) *Mérföldkövek a kulturális antropológiában.* Budapest: Panem. 657-711

Turner, Victor W. 1982. *From Ritual to Theatre.* New York: PAJ Publications. 20-60.

Van Gennep, Arnold. 1960. *The Rites of Passage*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Watzlawick, Paul., Weakland, John H. & Fisch, Richard 1974. *Change. Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution.* New York: Norton.

Zittoun, Tania, Duveen, Gerard, Gillespie, Alex, Ivinson, Gabrielle & Psaltis, Charis. 2003. The Use of Symbolic Resources in Developmental Transitions. *Culture and Psychology 9* (4) 415-447.

Zonda, Tamas & Veres, Elod. 2004. Az öngyilkosságok alakulása Magyarországon. (1970-2000) Suicide Trends in Hungary between 1970 and 2000. *Addictologia Hungarica 1.* 7-23.

Data sources used in the analysis:

Kadar, Janos. 1975. *Válogatott beszédek és cikkek 1957-1974. (Selected speeches and articles)* Budapest: Kossuth.

Kiss, Karoly. Rákosi elvtárs életéről. On Comrade Rakosi's life. In: *Szabad Nép* 24th February, 1952. p. 3.

Electronic data sources

Decision of the European Court (2008) in the case of prohibition on the use of red star,(www.politics.hu/20080709/european-court-overturns-hungarian-prohibition-on-communist-star, 21st October, 2008

Kadar's speech in 1957. http://www.videa.hu/videok/hirek-politika/kadar-beszede-57-majus-1-majalis-mszmp-MhmriVtyUzyJNmeE

Kadar's speech in 1989. Hungarian transcription by Mihaly Kornis. www.kornismihaly.hu/a_kadar_beszed.pdf. 14th May, 2010.

Rákosi's speech delivered on 1st July, 1953 at the Assembly of the Hungarian Workers' Party. mek.niif.hu/01900/01937/html/szerviz/dokument/rakosis0.htm, 14th May, 2010.

The Dunaszerdahely soccer scandal http://www.nemzetisport.hu/minden_mas_foci/20081101/szlovakia_magyar_serultek_a_dunaszerdahelyslovan_meccsen/

The Pecs soccer scandal http://www.kisalfold.hu/belfold_hirek/nem_engedtek_be_a_magyar_zaszlot_a_stadionba/2077997/ 18th January, 2009.

Hungarian support to multinational firms. http://www.mno.hu/portal/685084. 13th May, 2010.

Kadar's speech in 1985 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwevIvPBoSQ 13th May, 2010

Gyula Horn's biography http://www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/orszagos_lista/mszp/horn_gyula/horn_gyula_cikkek. 14th May, 2010.

Gyula Horn in 1956. http://www.mno.hu/portal/420987. 9th June, 2010.

Medgyessy as secret agent. http://mn.www2.mno.hu/portal/88923. 9th June, 2010

Viktor Orban's biography http://www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/pest_megye/pest_megye_teruleti_lista/dr_orban_viktor/eletrajz . 9th June, 2010.

Ferenc Gyurcsany's biography http://www.politaktika.hu/orszaggyulesi_kepviselok/orszagos_lista/mszp/gyurcsany_ferenc. 9th June, 2010.

The 2006 Balatonoszod speech http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm. 18th July, 2008.

Street demonstrations in 2006 http://www.index.hu/politika/belfold/2006/elkurtuk/galeriak/ 9th September, 2008.; http://www.mno.hu/portal/379917. 9th September, 2008.

Police Constable Gergényi receives an award: www.rtlhirek.hu/cikk/32173

Police Constable Gergényi is dismissed.
        http://index.hu/politika/belfold/gyrcsny1116/ (7th August, 2008).
Gyurcsany in 2008, HSP national assembly.
        http://kapcsolat.hu/blog/itt_a_beszed (14th May, 2010).